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WOMEN IN THE LAW
James J. White*
INTRODUCrION
N 1869 Belle A. Mansfield, reputedly the first female lawyer ad-
mitted to practice in the United States, was admitted to the state
bar of Iowa.' Others soon followed her and this dribble of women
entering the legal profession has grown to a persistent and contin-
uous trickle in the twentieth century, but it shows no signs of
becoming a flood.2 At last count approximately 7,000 out of Amer-
ica's 300,000 listed lawyers were women. 8
Since the practice of law-even in the most masculine and ag-
gressive Perry Mason style-does not require a strong back, large
muscles, or any of the other peculiarly male characteristics, one
might ask why women account for less than three per cent of all
lawyers. That question is only part of a larger and equally puzzling
inquiry about the status of women in medicine, engineering, busi-
ness, and government, but this study cannot hope to answer the
0 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1956, Amherst College;
J.D. 1962, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 60, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
The author's thanks go to Mrs. Gay Ford, his secretary, and Jay Herbst, a second-
year student in the University of Michigan Law School, who assisted in the preparation
of the entire article, and to Eric Schaal, a second-year student in the University of
Michigan Law School, who helped with Part IV. The author also wants to thank Mrs.
Judy Stillion, who coded all the data and put it on IBM cards, and Messrs. Stuart
Oskamp, Kent Marquis, and Frank Andrews, all of the Institute for Social Research,
who gave valuable assistance on statistical analysis.
Gay Ford and Jay Herbst deserve special thanks. Gay endured countless changes in
the manuscript and performed with equanimity the tedious tasks of sending, counting,
and sorting questionnaires. Jay's skillful and patient service as master of the computer
was invaluable. Without him and the computer, we could have made only a few of
the comparisons and analyses which appear on the following pages.
1. THoMS, WoMEN LAwyERs IN THE UNrrED STATES at vii (1957).
2. HANKiN & KIonmNE, THE AMERICAN LAwYER: 1964 STASCAL REPORT 29 (1965),
gives the following female listings:
Total Lawyers Female Per Cent of Lawyers
Year Listed Listings Listed in U.S.
1948 171,110 2,997 1.8
1951 204,111 5,059 2.5
1954 221,600 5,036 2.3
1957 235,785 6,350 2.7
1960 252,385 6,488 2.6
1963 268,782 7,143 2.7
3. In 1963, 7,143 woman lawyers (constituting 2.7% of all United States lawyers)
were listed in Martindale-Hubbell. See ibid. Neither the male nor the female figures
take into account the law graduates who are listed in Martindale-Hubbell.
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larger question and does not endeavor to do so; 4 rather, its purpose
is to investigate a ten-year segment of the small female contingent
in the American bar.
In the legal world, both in law school and in practice, one hears
a multitude of inconsistent rumors about the composition and status
of this female segment of the bar. One source will say that almost
all women lawyers are tough, masculine, and querulous; another,
with quite the opposite implication, will state that women come to
law school only to achieve the feminine goal of capturing a husband
by placing themselves in a most advantageous marriage market.
One woman will report that she has been turned away by one po-
tential employer after another because she is a woman. Another
will report that she is working for an outstanding large city law
firm and that she has received treatment from both her employer
and other firms which was in no way discriminatory. One counselor
will tell a woman to seek a job with a large firm where they can
"afford to hire a woman"; another will tell her to find a job with
a small firm where her individual abilities and capabilities will be
appreciated and where she will be treated fairly.
One purpose of this article is to report data from a large sample
of the women who are recent graduates of the country's law schools
in order to give some basis for drawing conclusions about what
women do and what opportunities are open to them. A second pur-
pose is to compare the status of these women with that of a matched
group of male graduates and to examine the possible causes for
some of the differences in their status. Finally, we shall make a
tentative examination of the forces at hand which might permit a
narrowing of the gap which exists between female and male status
where such a narrowing seems desirable.
I. THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. The Sample
In October of 1965 we wrote to each of the 134 accredited law
schools in the United States and asked each of them for the name
4. The following bear upon the larger question of the female's status in twentieth
century American society: BERNARD, ACADEMIC WOMEN (1964); MATrFELD & VAN AKEN,
WOMEN & THE SCIENTIFIC PROFESSIONS (1965); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963); REPORT
OF THE PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963); The Woman in
America, 93 DAEDALUS 579 (1964).
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and address of each of its female graduates in the classes of 1956
through 1965 inclusive, and the name and address of one male
from the same class for each such female. 108 schools ultimately
replied to this request and supplied 2,219 female names and 2,151
male names. 5 We mailed questionnaires6 to each of these women
and men. 1,298 female and 1,329 male respondents ultimately re-
turned usable7 questionnaires; 303 questionnaires were returned as
undeliverable; and 26 members of the sample refused to participate
in the study. The women who returned usable questionnaires con-
stituted 64.8% of those women whom we believe to have received
a questionnaire. The corresponding percentage with respect to men
was 66.4%. A detailed table showing response rates and percentages
is contained in Appendix B.
The careful reader will bear in mind several important qualifi-
cations in considering the following discussion and in extrapolating
from its results. First, he should not assume that either the female
or the male sample is an exact replica of the entire male or female
lawyer population. The sample comes entirely from the last ten
years' law graduates and omits the 30% to 40% of the males and
females in the sample who did not respond. Conceivably these silent
figures would have slipped into the calculations without the change
of a demical point in the tabulations; on the other hand, it is possi-
ble that they would have changed the results extensively. In the
male sample, this problem is aggravated by the fact that not all of
the law schools selected their male names on a truly random basis.8
5. 26 law schools sent us no female names. Two of those, Notre Dame and Wash-
ington and Lee, have never admitted female students and thus have no female gradu-
ates. The following schools responded that they had had no female graduates in the
period 1956 through 1965: the University of Idaho, University of Maine, Montana
State University, and Rutgers (at Camden). The following schools presumably had
female graduates but sent us no names: Boston University, Brooklyn Law School,
University of California-Hastings College of the Law, Salmon P. Chase, Chicago-Kent
Law School, Cleveland-Marshall Law School, De Paul, University of Detroit, University
of Florida, Georgetown, Gonzaga, Howard College, University of Illinois, New York
Law School, University of Oregon, St. John's, South Carolina State College, University
of Southern California, University of Tulsa, and Willamette. We have been unable to
acquire data from which we can determine with certainty how many females graduated
from the 134 accredited schools during the years 1956 through 1965. It is our best
estimate, on the basis of the returns from the 108 schools who did report, that the
number is no larger than 2,600 and that it probably is smaller than that.
6. Copies of the questionnaires and the letters which accompanied them are at-
tached as Appendix A.
7. Many of the questionnaires which were returned had not been completed. We
coded and used all of the data that was returned, no matter how fragmentary.
8. 879 males were chosen by the selection of the male name on an alphabetical class
list which next followed the matching female. We believe that this is a random selec-
April 1967 1053
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So reader beware: "Males" means those men in the sample who re-
sponded; "females" means the same with respect to the opposite
sex.
Finally, this report assumes that the respondents' memories were
accurate and their reporting truthful. Undoubtedly the statistics
have been rendered somewhat inaccurate by the failure of some to
recall and record correctly all of the data. In a few cases the figures
themselves hint at forgetfulness, disingenuousness, or distortion in
the sample. For example, approximately 50% of all the respondents
stated that they were in the top quarter of their graduating classes
and only 5% to 6% acknowledged residence in the bottom quarter.9
Perhaps these figures can be explained by the fact that many gradu-
ates do not know their quartile rank and gave themselves the bene-
fit of the doubt. Whatever the explanation, to the extent that this
report focuses on the differential between males and females, dis-
crepancies of this kind may not be significant if we can assume that
the males and females each gave themselves a uniform benefit of
the doubt when their recollections were faint or inaccurate. 0
B. Money
The questionnaire asked the respondent to state his adjusted
gross income (1) for his "first non-temporary job" after law school
and (2) for the calendar year 1964.11 The respondent did not state
his actual income but only marked an annual range (for example,
$5,001-$8,000). Exhibits 1 and 2 summarize the data given in re-
sponse to these questions.
tion method. 332 males were selected by a process unknown to us but characterized as
"random" by the responding schools. 323 were selected for having the academic
average which most nearly matched that of the female in the class which they were
chosen to match. The remaining 295 were selected by methods unknown to us.
9. See Exhibit 11 infra.
10. The percentages of males and females in each quartile of class standing were
surprisingly similar. The widest deviation was only 1.9%. For a complete comparison,
see Exhibit 11 infra.
11. The members of the classes of 1964 and 1965 were asked to state their adjusted
gross income or estimated adjusted gross income for their first full calendar year of
work after graduation from law school. Thus most of the members of the class of 1964
should have reported their income for the calendar year 1965 and most of the gradu-
ates from the class of 1965 should have reported their estimated income for the calendar
year 1966. Throughout the survey the respondents from the classes of 1965 and 1964
have been combined.
1054 (Vol. 65:1051
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EXHIBIT I'"
PRESENT INCOME
(Average Income in 1964, by Years Since Graduation)
N = 1277
Males
Females N = 834
0-1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Years Since Graduation
STARTING INCOME
(Average Income from First Job by Year of Graduation)
N = 257
Males
Feaes-1 1 1153
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964-5
Year Graduated
12, Exhibit I and each of the other exhibits showing respondents' incomes are
based upon the assumption that the average income of all persons marking a given
range was the mid-point in that range. This assumption is an approximation made
for want of any other convenient way to present the data in a readily understandable
form; the actual data by numbers and salary ranges are presented in Appendix C.
$8,000
$7,000
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$18,000
$16,000
$14,000
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
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EXHIBIT 2"2
PRESENT INCOME DISTRIBUTION
I/
I
Ij
I
I
,III /
[Vol. 65:1051
Males- N =
\ Females ---- N=
1277
834
0- 1,001- 5,001- 8,001- 10,001- 14,001- 17,001- 20,001- 25,001- 30,001-
1,000 5,000 8,000 10,000 14,000 17,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 over
Dollar Range
The starting income brackets were: Less than $1,000, $1,001-$5,000, $5,001-$8,000,
$8,001-$10,000, and over $10,000. The person who earned $5,000 in year 1 would be
treated as though he had earned $3,000. On the other hand, a person who earned $5,001
would be treated as though he earned $6,500. Thus, with the change of only one
dollar in starting income, a person's income would appear to jump $3,500 because of
our averaging assumption. The apparently large starting income jumps of the males
between 1958 and 1959 and between 1961 and 1962 and those of the females between
1959 and 1960 and between 1962 and 1963 are partly caused by the fact that a large
bulk of males or females respectively crossed over a segment boundary in those years.
Thus the true starting salary curve is probably a less jagged one than that shown on
the exhibit above. The data concerning present income in Exhibit 1 are presented in
tabular form in Appendix C.
In most cases, the number of responses which provide the basis for a given exhibit
will be reflected at the bottom of the exhibit. The difference in the number of responses
is attributable partly to the fact that some exhibits deal with only a portion of the
sample and partly to the fact that many respondents completed only part of the ques-
tionnaire.
Hereafter the use of the words "present income" on exhibits means income of
respondents in the calendar year, 1964, with the exception of the classes of 1964 and
1965, whose income is that indicated in note 11 supra.
13. The following is a gross tabulation of the intial incomes:
INITIAL ADJUsTEm GROSS INCOME
Females (N = 1174) Males (N = 1277)
Less than $1,000 6.1% .7%
$1,001-$5,000 35.5% 24.7%
$5,001-$8,000 47.8% 54.5%
$8,001-$10,000 6.9% 11.0%
over $10,000 3.7% 9.1%
$ I .. . .
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The message of each of the foregoing exhibits is the same and
it is clear: the males make a lot more money than do the females.
The differential in present income is approximately $1,500 for
those in their first year after graduation, and, with the passage
of each year, the males increase their lead over the females until
they pass off the graph at the class of 1956 with a $17,300 to
$9,000 lead and with no substantial appearance of abatement in
their rate of gain. In 1964, 9% of the males earned more than $20,-
000, but only 1% of the females had reached that level; 21%o of the
males exceeded $14,000, as compared with only 4.1%o' of the females.
The converse is true at the levels below $8,000, where one finds
56.3%o of the females but only 33.6% of the males. These figures
are not distorted by the inclusion of housewives or others who are
not employed full time at a paying job because only those employed
full time at a paying job were included.
Doubtless the reader can imagine a variety of rival hypotheses
in addition to discrimination which might explain the enormous
income difference between males and females. Some of these, such
as class standing, school, type of employer, and type of work, will
be considered in Part II of this article.
C. Job Profiles
Approximately 25%o of the respondents, both male and female,
found their first jobs with firms of 4 or under (including solo prac-
tice).1 4 There were only statistically insignificant differences15 in
the percentage of males and females taking their first jobs with firms
of over 29 and with the federal government. However, men far ex-
ceeded women in obtaining jobs with firms in the 5- to 30-man
category, and women had a substantial edge over men in state and
local government.
14. The category "firm of four or less" includes an undetermined but probably sig-
nificant number of respondents who were in solo practice or were partners and not
employees. This fact contaminates that category and renders it unreliable as a basis
for generalization about the small firm as an employer.
15. The statement that a difference is a statistically significant one means that the
distributions for the two data sets being compared differ by more than the critical value
of .05 when subjected to the Chi-square test. In layman's terms, if two groups do not
differ in a statistically significant way from one another, one would expect a random
division of the entire group to be as likely to produce the same differences between
the groups as those observed between the groups formed by the current method of
division. For example, the statement that men's I.Q.'s do not differ in a statistically
significant fashion from women's means that if one made a random division of the
entire mass of males and females into two groups, he would be likely to find as great
a difference between the two such groups as he found between the females and males.
Apri 1967] 1057
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EXHIBIT 38
INITIAL EMPLoYER
Type of Employer
fLaw Firms
Federal Government
*State &
Local Government
Judges-Clerkships
Corporations
Banks & Trusts
Unions
*Non-Law Jobs
*Law School
*Publishers
-fSize of Law Firm
30 and over
*16-80
15-15
4 or under
Females r----l N - 969
Males N = 1031
* Statistical Significance
- 14.5%R.6%
'13.27"
- 7.0%
8 .4%
-6.1%
,9.8%
13.5%
=3 2.1%
S1.4%
0
0
4.3%
, 3.1%
-- 4.8%
0 1.5%
011
24A%
21.6%
A comparison of male and female migrations from starting to
present jobs shows several significant differences. The percentage
of women in government work increases by more than 5%, while
the corresponding male percentage decreases by approximately the
same amount. Women increase their representation in firms of 15
and under by only 2.4%, but nearly 10% more men find their
present jobs with firms of 15 and under than started there. Other
migrations are less significant.
16. On any table in which numbers with respect to males and females appear, the
data with respect to females which is marked * differs in a statistically significant
manner from the corresponding data with respect to the males. In absence of such
marking and except where otherwise indicated, the reader may assume that no difference
of a statistically significant margin exists between the male and female data.
t The portion of the graph titled "Size of Law Firm" is a breakdown of the data
presented next to the title "Law Firms" above.
1058 [Vol. 65:1051
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EXHIBIT 417
PRESENT EmpLom
Type of Employer
tLaw Firms
Federal 'Government
State & Local
Government
Judges-Clerkships
Corporations-'
Banks & Trusts
Unioni
Non-Lawjobs
Law School
Publishers
Size of Law Firm
30 and over
16-30
5-15
4 4or under
Females . N = 833
Males N = 1078
142.6%
_16.4%
9.6%
166.6%Ms 6.1%
Z3.3.9%
-9.3%
11.9%
- 13.3%
3 1.7 %
"1.9%
0
[0
N 2.9%,
= 5.2%
* 2.f%
I 1.1%.
1 0
6.6%
9.1%"
S2.3%
-6.8%,
~ 8.5%
.17.5%
25.2%
Per Cent Chanke Froi
Initial Employer
--0.I
.z0% +10.4
+1.9
-4.0
+8.7
-0.9
-4.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
+0.5
0
0
+1.4
+0.2
+0.4
+0.9
0
0
-1.3
+0.8
---OA
-0.2
+12
+2.8
+1.
+7.028.6%
These statistics are consistent with two commonly held notions:
(1) men often use the government as a stepping stone to private prac-
tice; and (2) a large part of all women lawyers (about one third)
find long-term employment in government.
The comparative distribution of men and women in small,
medium, and large firms is puzzling. Women have roughly compa-
rable representation with men in small and large firms, but have sub-
stantially less representation in medium-sized firms. The question-
17. This exhibit shows only net movement of lawyers from one job to another. For
example, if one person moved from a corporate employer to a firm of 30 or over
and another person moved in the opposite direction, the two changes would cancel
each other and the table would show zero change. Female data were not tested for
statistically significant difference from male data in this exhibit.
t The portion of the graph titled "Size of Law Firm" is a breakdown of the data
presented next to the title "Law Firms" above.
April 1967]
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naire offered only tantalizing fragments of information to explain
these phenomena. The comparative lack of female representation
in the medium-sized firm may be explained by the function which
the female law graduate performs. If her function in the large
firms is to do research, mind the library, and perform other special-
ized tasks which fall somewhat short of practice on the same scale
as her male colleagues, her comparatively small representation in
the medium-sized firm can be explained by the fact that such firms
are not large enough to justify hiring her. However, since the small
firm is no better able to hire women exclusively for research or
library work than is the medium-sized firm, this analysis cannot
explain the extensive representation of women in the 4 or under
category. The answer here may lie in the peculiar status of lawyers
in these firms, which include solo practice and practice in which
the starting lawyer is something more than an ordinary employee.
For example, it includes cases in which a woman forms a partner-
ship with her husband, her father, or with another person of approx-
imately her own age. The questionnaire did not yield data on the
number in solo practice, nor did it give the number in practice
with husbands, fathers, or other relatives. Nonetheless, my discus-
sions with lawyers and my own observations of female practice sug-
gest that this form of practice is common for many women. Thus
the comparatively large representation of women in the 4 or
under category may be attributable to the fact that she does not
face the usual employer's discrimination either because she is not
an employee at all or because she has a familial relationship with a
member of the firm which overcomes any such discrimination.
D. First Jobs: Ten-Year Change
It is quite possible that the jobs available to the class of 1950
one year, five years, and ten years after graduation differ consider-
ably from the jobs available at the corresponding periods after
graduation to the members of the class of 1930. Since the data cover
only a ten-year time span, however, there is very little information
about changes in job profiles from one class to another. This is par-
ticularly true as to the respondents' present jobs, and it would be
misleading to compare the present jobs of a class only two or three
years out of law school with those of a class which had been out
eight years. In such a comparison, the change in profiles between
two classes would be obscured by the fact that one class had been
in practice longer than the other. For that reason, we have presented
a comparison of only the starting jobs of the two oldest and three
youngest classes.
1060 [Vol. 65:1051
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STARTiNG Jo--TEN-YEAR CHAnGz
Type of Employer
Females
Law Firms-30 and over
16-30
515
4 or under
Federal Government
State &'Local Government
Judges.Clerkships
Corporations
Banks & Trusts
Unions
Non-Law Jobs
Publishers
Males
Law Firms-30 and over
16-30
3Z15
4 or under
Federal Government
State & Local Government
Judges-Clerkships
Corporations
Banks & Trusts
Unions
Non-Law Jobs
Publishlers
_ Classes of '56 & '57;
MaleN = 180; Female N = 152
Classes of '63, '64, '65;
Male N = 415; Female N = S43
9.6%
2.0%
18.1%7.%
2 8.0%
18.4%
12.o%
15.8%
15.9%
5.0% S11.2%
10.5%
9.3%
0
0
1.9%
0.3%
.3%
6.1%
1.3%
.%
6.7%
5.5.6.
0.4
8.7%
113.9%
15.47.
19.3% 1567
1 15.0%
13.2%
00
~84%
7= 18.37"
0
0 
57
0
0
0
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Certain changes were common to both males and females: (1) more
now find their first jobs with firms of 30 or more, in clerkships, and
in state and local government than they did eight to ten years ago;
and (2) fewer find their first jobs in firms of 4 or under. Since our
data did not effectively distinguish between firms of 4 or under
and solo practice, it is not possible to tell what percentage of this
decrease is attributable to the fact that fewer lawyers are starting
out in solo practice. Once again, the 5- to 30-man firm plays the
villain. A substantially larger percentage of the men started with
such firms in the 1963 to 1965 period than ten years ago, but the
corresponding percentage of women starting with such firms has
diminished. Except to the extent that the data show discrimination
generally, they give no explanation for the opposite movement of
men and women in this case.
E. Work Performed
The survey disclosed interesting differences between the areas
of work of men and women. Most of the respondents indicated that
they performed more than one kind of work; many acknowledged
the performance of all of the types indicated in Exhibit 6. The pro-
portion of females engaged in trusts and estates (60%), domestic
relations (50%), and tax (31%) were higher than the proportion of
men engaged in those activities. These data accord with the com-
monly held beliefs about women's practice. The fact that 45.6%
engage in litigation and 27.7% in criminal work is more surpris-
ing. Since the question did not limit "litigation" to actively con-
tested adversary court proceedings, some may have acknowledged
participation in litigation even though their court appearances
amounted to nothing more than procuring a signature on a probate
order or obtaining an occasional uncontested divorce. However, even
if the number is reduced somewhat to account for those who marked
litigation but do not engage in adversary proceedings, the size of
the female response to this question and to the question about the
number of court appearances per year 8 indicate that a substantial
part of the practicing women carry on an active trial practice and
are not hidden away in the "women's specialties."
18. See note 57 infra.
[Vol. 65:1051
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EXHIBIT 6
TYPEs oF WORK PERFORMED
(EXCLUDING THosE EMPLOYED BY GOVERNMENT)
Females N = 575
Type of Vork Males 
N =952
Statistical Significance.
*Trusts & Estates .52.7%
Real Estate 51.0%52.8%
*Domestic Relations 49.8%
38.6%
*Litigation 1 45.6% 58.5%
*Corporate 1 42.0%
53.8%
Tax 1 1.0%0
27.9%
Criminal 27.7%
= 28.0%
Labor " 7.3%
11.8%
Another question asked the respondent to state his "type of
work performed" (singular) in one or two words and suggested
"general practice" as a sample answer. Although the question did
not define "specialty," any answer other than general practice prob-
ably indicates that the respondent devoted a substantial amount of
time to the type of work listed.
19. One should note that the exhibit tells nothing about the percentage of his
working hours that any respondent devoted to any one of the types of work men-
tioned, nor does it tell anything about the level of responsibility or the specific kind
of work performed within the general type mentioned. For instance, both a highly
paid tax specialist who did nothing but complex corporate tax planning and a lawyer
who made out five returns a year would properly list "tax" among the types of work
which he performed. The respondents employed by the federal government showed the
following distribution of work performed:
FEDEL GOVERNMENT JOBS
Type of Work Females (N = 78) Males (N = 50)
Litigation 34.6% 42.0%
Labor 23.0% 16.0%
Tax 21.8% 24.0%
Corporation 6.4% 4.0%
Real property 6.4% 4.0%
Criminal 5.1% 2.0%
Other 2.7% 8.0%
HeinOnline  -- 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1063 1966-1967
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EXHIBIT 70
WoRK Drsca , oN-P NT JoB
Type .of Work Females r--- N = 654
Males N 1115
General 31.4%
Practice 49.0%
Litigation '7.0%7.2%
Corporate 5.2%3.8%
Tx4.8%
Tax 83.5%
Trusts 4.1%
& Estates 1.1%
4.1%
Criminal .1%
Labor 1.8%2.2%1.5%
Real Estate 1.7%
Domestic 0.8%
Relations 0
Other 139.87
(Including 29.4% 8
Non-Law)
Only 30% of the women stated that they were engaged in "gen-
eral practice," but nearly 50% of the males so characterized their
practice. The study produced no data which explain this apparent
female propensity to specialize. One can speculate that the woman
makes a conscious choice to avoid general practice because she be-
lieves that a special skill will reduce or overcome sex discrimination.
Or, the relative absence of women in general practice may mean
only that some employers hire women for specialized positions in
probate, tax, and other fields. Whatever the explanation, the data
presented in Exhibit 13 infra show that women who listed a type of
work other than general practice usually made more money than
their sisters in general practice.2' Although the woman is likely to
increase her earnings by moving out of general practice, the table
also shows that her chances of reducing the margin between herself
and males in the same kind of practice are only slightly better than
even, for in several cases the incomes of the male specialists exceeded
those of their general practitioner brethren by as much as the fe-
male specialists' income exceeded that of female general practi-
tioners.
20. Female data were not tested for statistically significant difference from male data.
21. Many of the respondents believed that specialization would improve the woman's
opportunities. In response to a question about the advice they would give a neophyte
female lawyer, 6% of the female respondents and 9% of the male respondents recom-
mended that she specialize.
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F. Family
Twenty-eight per cent of the women and 25.6% of the men had at
least one lawyer among their parents, grandparents, uncles, and
aunts. This difference between men and women in the aggregate is
not statistically significant. On the other hand, the percentage of
women who had a female relative in the law was greater than the
corresponding percentage for men by a statistically significant mar-
gin.22 However, this was not a factor of great importance in explain-
ing professional choice, for only 47 out of 1,300 women had a female-
lawyer relative.
A more fertile ground for inquiry is the respondent's own marital
and maternal status. 890 (69.0%) of the women and 1,098 (83.2%)
of the men were or had been married at the time of the study.23
The following exhibit summarizes family-work relations:
EXHIBIT 8
FAMILY-WORK RiELATIONS
Married Married
Females Females
Single without with
Males Females Females Children Children
Full-time 85.5% 65.3% 83.5% 74.5% 44.5%
Part-time 3.8% 12.1% 5.5% 4.0% 22.2%
Not working - 12.9% - 11.2% 25.7%
Not responding 10.6% 9.7% 11.0% 10.3% 7.6%
to this
question N = 1329 N = 1298 N = 475 N = 276 N = 534
Previous studies have indicated that marriage alone does not
usually cause a woman who is working to cease working, and our
22. The mothers of only 4 of the males and 20 of the females were lawyers. 15 males
and 25 females had an aunt who was a lawyer. The following table summarizes the
data on relatives of the respondents:
Relation of
Lawyer-Ancestor Females Males
Father 185 176
Mother 20 4
Uncle 155 199
Aunt 25 15
Grandfather 77 72
Grandmother 2 4
464 470
23. The questionnaire did not ask the respondent to state whether or not he had
been divorced. Some volunteered that information in response to a question about
their marital status, but the absence of a specific question renders the data on divorce
unreliable. All references to "married" females and males mean those who were or had
been married at the time they answered the questionnaire.
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data are consistent with those findings.24 More than half of the full-
time employed women were married, and only 19 (6.1%) of the
women who were not practicing at the time they answered the ques-
tionnaire acknowledged that they had left practice "to get mar-
ried." Of all of those who had ceased practice, only 5.4% left in the
same year as their marriage without having a child. 85 (27.3%) of
the females who were not practicing acknowledged that they ceased
practice to have a child and another 73 (23.5%) acknowledged hav-
ing ceased practice to "devote time" to their families. The data in-
dicate that 54.0% of those who left practice did so in the same year
or in the year following the birth of their first child. Although the
birth of a child will necessarily cause some interruption in a wom-
an's practice, the data suggest that it is also an event which may
cause a more lengthy, if not necessarily permanent, departure from
practice. However, it is by no means true that the birth of a child
always means departure from practice. 27.8% of all full-time em-
ployed women were married and had children. Moreover, most of
these children were less than seven years old.25
The following exhibit reflects the relation between type of em-
ployer and marital and maternal status for the full-time employed
women who responded to the relevant questions.
EXHIBIT 9
TYPE OF EMPLOYER BY MAarrTAL-MATERNAL STATUS or FEMALE
Married without Married with
Single Children Children
Type of Employer (N = 39b (N = 205) (N 27)
Government 37.07. 41.6% 272.%
Firms-4 or under 23.3%. 25.0% 39.4%
Corportions 20.5% 2.8%.8 6.5%
Firms-SO and over 12.7F% 8.%V
Others 16.5% 27.% 5.6%
The women who continue full-time practice after the birth of a child
are heavily concentrated in the 4 or under category and their ranks
24. See Rossi, A Plan for the Analysis of Women College Graduates 5 (National
Opinion Research Center, 1965).
25. The following table summarizes the maternal status of the women who were em-
ployed full-time in 1964:
AGE OF CHILDREN FOR FULL-TIME EMPLOYED FEMALES
Age of Youngest Child Number of Females (N = 237) Per Cent
Child under 5 162 68.5
Child 5 to 7 30 12.6
Child 7 to 10 15 6.3
No response to age of child s0 12.6
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in larger firms and government are reduced, but the data do not
reveal the reasons for these results. Higher earnings alone are not a
satisfactory explanation, for the women with children both in large
firms and in government earned more money than did their sisters in
the firms of 4 or under. It is possible that solo practice and small
firms have a flexibility which suits the mother of a small child. Many
large firms and government agencies may not offer the necessary
flexibility because of their size and attendant bureaucratic rigidity,
or they may offer it only when it is accompanied by a second-class
status which the woman will not accept.
Although married women without children are more heavily
represented in government and in firms of 30 and over than are
either single women or women with children, these data do not
necessarily mean that childless married women are more likely to
find places with government agencies and large firms than are un-
married women, for many of the childless married women were
unmarried at the time they took the jobs reflected in the exhibit.26
One might expect married women to earn less money than their
unmarried female colleagues for two reasons: married women pre-
sumably need less money because they are maried to men who are
expected to support them; and a married woman's devotion to the
job and resulting productivity may be less than that of a man or
an unmarried woman, since both of the latter presumably seek their
primary satisfaction from job success. However, the data contradict
these expectations. The full-time employed married women in the
classes of 1956 through 1960 earned significantly more money in
1964 than did the unmarried women in the corresponding classes.2 7
One can make a variety of interesting speculations about this find-
ing.28 It might be explained by the fact that some married women
26. The data may mean only that women who go with large firms marry colleagues
there.
27. The following chart compares the income in 1964 of full-time employed married
and unmarried females:
1964-65 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956
Married $6750 $6200 $6600 $7800 $9200 $8100 $9200 $11900 $10800
Unmarried $6200 $7400 $6650 $8600 $8700 $7800 $8350 $10800 $9250
28. The higher earnings of married women are not attributable to the fact that
married women demand a job with relatively high pay or accept none at all, for an
analysis of the figures shows that married women were spread over a wider spectrum
on the income scale than were unmarried women. They had a higher average income
not because of an absence of their numbers in the lower ranges but because of an
abundance of their numbers in the higher ranges.
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practice with their husbands and are able to make more advanta-
geous monetary agreements than if they were dealing with other
males. On the other hand, it may simply reflect a relationship be-
tween the emotional qualities which lead a woman to take a mate
and those which make her acceptable to clients and colleagues. Un-
fortunately, the data do not give any satisfactory explanation for
the higher earnings of married women.
G. Attitudes and Opinions
Nearly half of the women stated that they believed that they had
"certainly or almost certainly" been the object of discrimination
because of sex by their present, a former, or a potential employer.
Another 17% of the women thought that they had "probably" been
the object of such discrimination.2 9 Upon observing this wide-spread
conviction among the women, and upon seeing that many women
either have ceased practice or are earning much less than their male
counterparts, one might expect that many women would regret their
decision to become lawyers. The study contradicts such a conclu-
sion. In response to a question whether they would again become a
lawyer if they "had to do it over," 1,150 (94.1%) of the women
answered affirmatively; only 72 (5.9%) said they would not. These
responses do not differ significantly from those of the males.
Another indication of female optimism is given by the women's
answers to a question which asked what advice they would give a
present-day female law student seeking employment. 10% of the
women would instruct her to work hard and prove herself; another
6% would counsel patience and perseverance; and nearly 13%
would tell her to do well in school. On the other hand, only 3% of
the men think it is important that she work hard to prove herself;
only 2.2% counsel patience and perseverance; and only 6.3% think
it important that she do well in school.30 No women would have
told the prospective female graduate to "forget it," but nearly 8%
of the men would have so advised her. It appears, therefore, that
the women have a continuing, and perhaps irrational, belief that
hard work, good grades, and perseverance will overcome the ob-
29. For a summary of the responses to the question concerning beliefs about
discrimination, see Exhibit 15 infra.
30. Our data show that the advice with respect to grades is sound in that a
female's income tends to increase in relation to her grades. See note 33 infra. The
questionnaire solicited no information which accurately tells whether hard work and
perseverance are effective, but the aggregate income figures suggest that the male
pessimism may be nearer to the truth than is the female optimism.
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stacles which they face, whereas the men are less sanguine about the
effect of these factors upon the success of the potential woman
lawyer.
H. Motives for Studying Law
It is sometimes suggested that differences between male and
female status in the bar are attributable to the different motives
which men and women have for entering the profession. The argu-
ment is as follows: Women are really social workers who wish to
become lawyers for the unselfish reason of helping the poor and
oppressed; although these motives are laudable, they render the
woman a less able representative of the profit-motivated business
client than is a standard male lawyer who, like the businessman, is
strongly influenced by monetary motives. In an attempt to test this
theory, one question sought the respondent's motivation for going
to law school. He was asked to state whether each of six different
motives was "very important, important, so-so, or not important"
to him in his decision to enter law school. The answers to that ques-
tion are inconsistent with the "social worker" characterization of
women lawyers. The percentage of women who marked "desire to
help society" as "important" or "very important" exceeded that of
the males by a margin which was not statistically significant (59%
to 53%), while the percentage of females who marked "good re-
muneration" as "important" or "very important" exceeded the
males by a margin which was statistically significant (70% to 60%).
Indeed, twice the percentage of women as men stated that good
remuneration was a "very important" reason.
EXHIBIT 10
REASONS FOR ATrENDING LAW SCHOOL
Very Not
Important Important So-So Important
Female
Desire To N = 1194 1
Help Society Male 23.9% 35.3% 25.7% 15.1%
N = 1256
14.9% 38.4% 31.1% 16.6%
Female
Good N =422
Remuneration Male 30A% 40.3% 16.7% 12.6%.
N = 611 S .-1
14.9% 45.8% 34.4% 4.9%
April 1967] 1069
HeinOnline  -- 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1069 1966-1967
Michigan Law Review
For two reasons, these data probably do not justify the conclu-
sion that the prospect of monetary gain more strongly influenced
women than it did men to take up the practice of law: (1) women
more than men tended to mark "very important" or "important"
as to all of the motives and the women's responses may simply reflect
this female inclination to depict each of the motives "important"
or "very important"; and (2) a large number of the women placed
no mark at all in the "good remuneration" boxes. We cannot state
whether these women would have rated the, monetary motive as
relatively important or unimportant, but if one infers from the ab-
sence of any mark that the motive was only "so-so" or "unimportant"
to them, then he may conclude that the women as a whole were less
strongly influenced by monetary considerations than were the males.
Nevertheless, it is clear that a substantial part of the women
were strongly motivated by a desire to make "good money" and
that the "social worker" characterization does not fit them to any
greater degree than it fits the men. One wonders whether other
assumptions about the woman lawyer's motives and beliefs are
equally as inaccurate as the one that they are uniformly motivated
to become lawyers by a desire to help society.
II. ANALYsis OF DISCIUMINATION
Part II of this study is an examination of some of the possible
explanations for the male-female income differential reported in
Part I. The principal reason for selecting income as the focal point
of the discrimination analysis is my belief that it is the most uni-
versally recognized single measure of success in American society.
It is an even more universal measure when one limits his inquiry
to a single profession, for this limitation renders irrelevant any spe-
cial recognition which may inhere in membership in a particular
group, such as the medical or legal professions. Another reason for
using income as the focus is that adjusted gross income, unlike non-
monetary rewards, is a specific thing which is capable of certain
measurement. Except for exceedingly modest deviations, its mean-
ing is the same for all American taxpayers; thus one comparing the
adjusted gross income of two persons faces none of the definitional
problems which he would have in comparing recognition or status
within the profession. Finally, it is my impression that the income
associated with a particular mode of practice (that is, large firm,
house counsel, small firm) is closely related to the status of that
mode within the profession. Thus, when one finds that women earn
less than men, he is likely also to find that they are concentrated in
jobs of less status than those of men.
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In his study of income differential, the hurried traveler on the
devious way of statistical analysis is tempted to end his journey by
a short cut from the observation of a wide income difference be-
tween the males and the females to the conclusion that it was caused
by unjustified discrimination against the females. However, the
more careful traveler will take the slower route of examining the
other plausible causes for such a differential and may find that his
data cannot carry him all the way to his conclusion. The following
discussion will deal with ten of the factors other than discrimina-
tion which might have caused or contributed to the observed in-
come differential.
Obviously many things other than one's sex have an effect upon
how much one earns. If any factor inherent in the psychology or
intellect of "woman" is excluded for the moment, there are still
many factors which, solely or in combination, could have caused
the observed difference between the incomes of the males and fe-
males or which could have caused the incomes of the males and fe-
males in our sample to fail to be representative of the incomes of
male and female lawyers of their age groups in the bar generally.
In attempting to examine the other plausible hypotheses, we have
arbitrarily classified them in the following way: (1) failure of the
women to work full time; (2) greater experience on the part of the
men; (3) class rank and law review participation; (4) school attended;
(5) type of employer; (6) type of work performed; (7) type of work
sought by men and women; (8) composition of the 35% of the sam-
ple who did not respond; (9) failure of the male sample to be repre-
sentative of males in the bar generally; (10) forgetfulness and dis-
ingenuousness of the respondents.3 1
We can dispose of the first two of these objections at once. While
it is true that many women in the sample did not work or worked
only part time, the comparative income figures were not distorted
by that fact because only women who were working full time were
included in computing those figures. Second, although experience
in law practice is not exclusively a function of the passage of time
since graduation from law school, time since graduation in a sample
greater than 1,000 probably is a satisfactory measure of experience
for the purposes of a gross comparison of aggregate income. Since
the income comparisons were made by year of graduation from law
31. A final factor which may play some part in this income differential is that a
disproportionately large part of the females may be Jewish or members of other
minority groups. If so, part of the observed income differential may be attributed to
discrimination against these groups. The questionnaire solicited no data on the
respondent's racial, ethnic, or religious backgrounds; therefore we can neither prove
nor disprove this possibility.
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school and since an income differential existed between the male
and female members of each class, the differences cannot be ade-
quately explained by arguing that the men had had more experience
than had the women in the sample.
A. Class Rank and Law Review
Several studies support the proposition that one's starting and
ultimate income as a lawyer are related to his class standing and
law review participation.3 2 Our findings are consistent with that
proposition and show that, as a general rule, the law review partici-
pant will earn more than the non-law review participant and, with
some exceptions, the higher one is in his class, the more money he
is likely to earn.33 An analysis of the following exhibit, however,
shows that this factor does not account for the difference between
the incomes of the female and male samples, for neither the entire
female sample nor the full-time employed females differed signifi-
cantly from the male sample in class rank or law review participa-
tion.
32. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CLASS OF 1955-IOTH YEAR CLASS REPORT (1965); Well-
man, Memorandum to the Law Faculty and Law Class of 1951 (University of Michigan
Law School, April 1966).
88.
AVERAGE PRESENT INCOME BY CLASS RANK AND LAW REVIEW
Females
Classes of Classes of Classes of
Class Rank 1956-58 1959-61 1962-65
Upper 10% $10,700 $9,700 $7,500
Upper quarter but
below 10% 12,000 7,600 7,100
Second quarter 10,300 8,400 7,000
Third quarter 9,500 9,000 6,500
Fourth quarter t t 6,000
t Insufficient response to get a meaningful figure.
Law review 12,000 9,200 7,800
No law review 10,100 8,400 6,600
N = 260 N = 316 N = 534
Males
Classes of Classes of Classes of
Class Rank 1956-58 1959-61 1962-65
Upper 10% $18,700 $14,000 $10,000
Upper quarter but
below upper 10% 17,400 12,000 8,700
Second quarter 14,700 12,600 8,800
Third quarter 14,600 11,500 8,000
Fourth quarter 14,200 10,500 7,700
Law review 18,200 13,500 9,400
No law review 16,000 12,000 8,600
N = 319 N = 329 N = 609
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EXHIBIT 11
CLASS RANK AND LAW RwVmW PARTICIPATION
Class Rank Females Males
Upper 10% 30.3% 29.5%
Upper quarter but below
upper 10% 25.0% 23.1%
Second quarter 25.4% 27.0%
Third quarter 13.9% 14.8%
Fourth quarter 5.4% 5.7%
N = 1230 N = 1317
Law review 25.1% 28.8%
Not on law review 74.9% 71.2%
N = 1241 N = 1254
B. School Attended
For a variety of reasons, one might hypothesize that the gradu-
ates of the most widely known and highly respected law schools
would have higher aggregate incomes than the graduates of other
schools. If so, and if a larger part of the men than the women in
the sample came from such schools, this could be a contributing
factor to the income differential. To test for this kind of bias in
the sample, we divided both the men and the women into those
who were graduates of nine schools which we considered to be rela-
tively high in prestige and those who were graduates of all the re-
maining law schools.3 4 There was no statistically significant differ-
ence between the percentage of men and women in each of the two
groups. Thus, whatever the effect of the type of school attended
upon a lawyer's income, that factor cannot explain the male-female
income differential revealed by this study.
Our statistics did cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the
hypothesis that attendance at a prestige school results in higher in-
come. The starting salaries of the men from "non-prestige" schools
in six out of the nine classes which we tested, and the present salaries
in five out of the nine classes, exceeded the respective average sala-
ries of the male graduates of the prestige schools. These figures are
not conclusive, however, for the present income of prestige male
graduates in the classes of 1956, 1957, and 1958 exceeded the sala-
ries of their "non-prestige" counterparts, and the margin appeared
to be growing. Perhaps the graduates of prestige schools concentrate
in jobs which have greater ultimate income potential but which pay
less for the first five or six years. The prestige-school hypothesis ap-
peared to be more uniformly accurate for the women; the prestige
34. I have selected the nine schools on the basis of the mean LSAT scores of their
student bodies and on the basis of my own subjective observation of the esteem in
which they are held by others on law faculties and in law practice.
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females' average starting income exceeded that of the other women
for seven out of the nine graduating classes examined, and the pres-
ent salary of the prestige women exceeded that of the other women
in six out of the nine classes. 35
PRESENT AVERAGE INCOME BY TYPE OF SCHOOL
(Prestige and Non-Prestige Schools)
N = 355
N = 902Non-Prestige Males
Prestige Males
Males
N = 620
'. - ..... N =219
Non-Prestige Females
Females -- - Prestige Females
I I , I I I
64-65 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56
Year of Graduation
STARTING AVERAGE INCOME BY TYPE OF SCHOOL
(Prestige and Non-Prestige Schools)
Males
Year of Graduation
1964-
1965 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956
Prestige
Males
(N = 359) $7,100 7,500 7,300 6,900 6,700 7,000 6,400 5,500 4,800
Non-Prestige
Males
(N = 898) $7,700 7,700 7,500 6,800 6,900 6,400 5,100 6,500 5,600
Females
Year of Graduation
1964-
1965 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956
Prestige
Females
(N = 321) $6,900 7,100 6,800 6,300 5,900 5,600 4,700 5,000 3,700
Non-Prestige
Females
(N = 852) $6,300 6,100 5,500 5,900 5,800 4,800 5,200 4,700 4,400
$18,000
$16,000
$14,000
$12,000
P $0,000
I
$8,000 t
$6,000
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C. Type of Employer
In 1964, approximately one-third of the full-time employed
women worked for federal, state, or local governments, while only
15.7% of the men found their jobs in government. Exhibit 4 supra
shows other but less significant differences between the types of em-
ployers of the men and women. One might argue that women, for
whatever reason, hold those jobs which are uniformly low-paying
irrespective of the sex of the holder, and that the income differential
between the males and females is caused by these differences in the
type of employment. The graphs on the following page, which divide
the males and females into three three-year blocs and by eleven kinds
of employers, show that the income differential between the men and
women indeed varied from job to job. Yet they also show that the
average present income of the men exceeded that of the women by
substantial margins in almost all of the possible combinations of
year of graduation and job type.
Contrary to what one might expect, the heavy concentration of
women in government does not increase the income differential. If
the women in the government jobs are removed from the sample,
the aggregate female income decreases and the differential between
them and the males grows larger.3 0 On the other hand, if the same
percentage of women as men were employed by each kind of em-
ployer, at the present average salary of women currently working
For each such employer, the aggregate income differential between
males and females would decrease; but the reduction would be only
a few per cent. Thus, the concentration of females in the service of
certain employers can explain no more than a small part of the in-
come differential.
36. The following exhibit shows the effect of the elimination of women employed
by the federal government and those employed by federal, state, and local govern-
ments upon the aggregate income of the females.
PRESENT INCOME FOR FuLL-TsM FEMALES
All Females
All Females Except Those
Year Except Those in Fed., State
Graduated All Females in Fed. Gov't & Local Gov't
1964 $6,500 $6,500 $6,400
1963 6,600 6,600 6,600
1962 6,700 6,500 6,600
1961 7,400 7,200 7,200
1960 8,000 7,600 7,500
1959 7,500 7,200 6,900
1958 8,100 8,000 8,100
1957 9,500 9,300 8,700
1956 9,000 8,700 8,300
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EXHIBIT 121
PRESENT INCOME BY EMPLOYER
Classes of 1956-58
Males
N = 264
nales
'166\/ " N=
Law Law Law Firm- Fed. State & Corps. Law
Firm- Firm- 4-Under Gov't Local Gov't Schools
30+ 5-15 Solo
P rac. Type of Employer
Classes of 1959-61
$13,000.
$11,000j
$9,000
$16,000
$14,000
S$12,000
$ 10,000-
$8,00
46,000.
I ' I ! ! ' r II ILaw Law Law Law Fed. State & Corps. Banks- Non- Law
Firm-Firm-Firm- Firm- Gov't Local Gov't Trusts Law Schools .
30+ 16-30 5-15 4-Under
Solo Prac. Type of Employer
Males
N'= 513
-IN =383
Females
Law Law Law Law Fed. State Judges Corps.Banks- Non- Law
Firm- Firm-Firm- Firm- Gov't & Trusts Law Schools
30+ 16-30 5-15 4-Under Local
Solo Prac. Gov't
Type of Employer
37. Those categories not represented on the graph had five or fewer responses for
the females.
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$19,000
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MalesrN = 280
Females
N=221
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D. Type of Work Performed
The questionnaire did not define or explicitly solicit informa-
tion about the various specialties. As indicated above,38 however,
it is probably safe to assume that anyone stating his "type of work"
(singular) to be something other than "general practice" devoted
a substantial amount, perhaps the bulk, of his time to the type of
work which he listed. The graphs on the following page show that
the type of work performed is relevant in determining income, but
they also show that the income of the males exceeded that of their
female counterparts in almost every category.
Because of the wide income differences which exist between
men and women within nearly every category of work performed,
the data suggest that the differences in the type of work performed
do not explain the male-female income differential. This conclu-
sion must be more tentative than some of those reached above for
two reasons. First, the question was not explicit and it is possible,
for example, that some who should be considered tax specialists
listed general practice as their type of work, while others whom one
would consider general practitioners may have listed tax because
10% or 15% of their work lay in that area. A second and more im-
portant deficiency in the data is that they do not tell us anything
about the level of responsibility which the respondent has or about
the sophistication and degree of difficulty of the work which he per-
forms. It is possible, for example, that the women who listed litiga-
tion as a specialty engaged mostly in "nickel and dime" cases and
that the men dealt principally in litigation involving more money
and greater responsibility. Of course, the converse may as well be
true; we simply cannot say.8 9
58. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
59. In at least one case, the data do hint that women of comparable experience
with men are performing different functions for certain employers. These data (re-
ported more fully in the text accompanying note 64 infra) are that females see signifi-
cantly fewer clients in firms of 16 or more than do males in those firms; perhaps they
also have less authority and responsibility.
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Classes of 1956-58
Type of Work
Males
N =277
Females
N = 215
Liti- Trusts Labor Tax Corp. Real Cri- Gen'l Other &
gation & Estate inal Prac. Non-Law
Estates Type of Work
Classes of 1962-65JMales
N = 522
Females
N = 370
Tax Cop CIm Ge'l O er
Tax Corp. Crim- Gen'l. Other&f
inal Prac. Non-Law
Type of Work
Liti- Trusts
gation &
Estates
40. Those categories not represented on the graphs had five or fewer responses for
the females.
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EXHIBIT 150
PRESENT INCOME BY TYPE OF WORK
$21,000
$19,000
0
U
$17,000
CIS
e $15,000
$13,000
$11,000
$9,000
$14,000,
$12,000.
$10,000 I__
$8,000
$10,000-
$8,000
$6,000
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E. Type of Job Sought
The data presented above show that a substantial income differ-
ential exists between the men and the women even when one limits
the examination to a single kind of employer. However, the data
also show that both men and women earned more money from cer-
tain employers than from others. If, therefore, a larger percentage
of the women found employment with the higher-paying employers
than is presently the case, and if there were no corresponding shift
by males, the aggregate income differential between the males and
females would be reduced. Consequently, it may be argued that at
least a part of the income differential is attributable to the fact that
women seek employment in those jobs which pay less money.
The law student's typical method of seeking employment is to
write a prospective employer, interview the employer, or both. The
questionnaire asked each respondent to state the number of such
interviews he had and the number of such letters he wrote with re-
spect to various kinds of employers. The results are reflected in
Exhibit 14. At least insofar as the type of job sought is reflected by
the numbers of letters sent and interviews held, the data show a
significant difference in the kinds of jobs sought by men and women.
A significantly larger portion of the women sought jobs in federal,
state, and local governments, as judicial clerks, and in banks and
trust companies. A significantly smaller share sought jobs with firms
of 5 to 15. An examination of Exhibit 13 suggests that the female
decision to seek more jobs with the federal government and to seek
fewer jobs with the firms of 5 to 15 may have actually caused them
to earn more, not less, money and that it reduced, rather than in-
creased, the income differential between the males and females. On
the other hand, it appears that the jobs with banks and trust com-
panies and in state and local government probably paid less money
than the women might have earned elsewhere, thereby contributing
to the income differential. Had each kind of employer hired a per-
centage of women equal to the percentage of interview and letter
contacts, and had they been hired at the average income of the
women in fact employed by that type of employer, the female in-
come would have increased rather than decreased.41 To put it an-
other way, the women appeared to be seeking higher paying jobs
than those they ultimately acquired. However, because of the wide
41. The increase in income would be as follows: The graduating dasses of 1956-1958,
8.4% increase; 1959-1961, 1.9% increase; and 1962-1965, 4.5% increase.
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male-female income difference with respect to almost every kind of
employer, it appears that no amount of female job seeking would
have significantly closed the income gap.
EXHIBIT 1442
RsPONDENTS' INTERviEWs WIH ImuiAn EmnOPy's
Type of Employer
Law Firm-30
and over
16 to 30
*5 to 15
4 or under
*Federal
Government
*State & Local
Government
*Judges
(clrkships)
Corporations
*Banks & Trusts
Unions
Non-law
Females Males
6,569 interviews 7,485 interviews
*Statistical Significance
1 9.7%
13.8%
15.1%
14.BoC
14.5%
21.3%
18.1%
2 14.9%
~-9.47,
.9% -Z38A.9%
48A%
17.4%
_ _ _ _ 7.0%15.8%
2.6%
0 0.3%,
3.9%
- 2.8%
F. The Silent 35 Per Cent
That tantalizing, silent portion of the sample who received a
questionnaire but did not return it are the bane of the mail inter-
viewer's existence. In this study, approximately 790 men and 887
women to whom questionnaires were sent did not return them. One
who would generalize about the population on the basis of his re-
turns is always faced with the argument that the non-respondents
were significantly, even radically, different from those who did re-
42. These data pertain only to the first permanent job sought after graduation
and do not include interviews for second or third jobs. The following is a graph of
the data reflected in Exhibit 14 except that in the following graph each respondent was
counted only once with respect to each type of employer no matter how many inter-
views he had with that type of employer. If, for example, a respondent reported 5
interviews with law firms of 30 or more and 2 interviews with federal governmental
agencies, he is counted only once in the firms of 30 or more category and once in the
federal government category. In Exhibit 14, each of his 7 interviews would have been
reflected.
See graph on facing page.
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spond. Of course, if those who did not respond are spread over the
same spectrum as those who did respond, they present no problem.
Since this study focuses on the differential between males and fe-
males, the non-respondents do not present any substantial problem,
even if they are different from those who did respond, as long as
the male and female non-respondents are like one another. If, for
example, most of those who did not respond had very low incomes,
this factor would reduce the aggregate male income, but it would
also reduce the aggregate income of the females. There might be a
net change in the male-female differential, but it would probably
not be an important one. Thus the silent 352o can destroy the
validity of the survey's findings only if we assume both that the male
and female non-respondents are different from each other and that
at least one of the non-responding groups is different from the re-
spondents of its own sex.
The data collected give no basis for concluding that such differ-
ences exist between the non-respondent males and females. Indeed,
in the one case where it appears that a substantial group might not
have responded (those in the bottom quarter of their law school
classes), the percentages of apparent male and female non-respon-
.ESPONDENTS Wno HAD AT LEAsrONE INTLAL JOB INTERVIEW Wrr'TmsE EmPLOYERS
Type of Employer
Law Firm-0 ] 10.9%
and over l 12.3%
16430 19.4%,
5-15 12.4%I I I I 22I° I [17.4%
4 or under 1 14.0%
I 18.1%
Federal Govt. 1 14.1%!,9.9%
State& Local 11.0%
Govt. 7.1%
Judges-Clerkships 9.8%
Corporations 7.2% II 8.5%
Banlcs&Trusts 5.2% Females
1 2.9% 3,144 interviews
Unions "03%
I 0.4% Males -
Non-Law :3-5.7% a,333 inteivieWs
(Female data was not tested for statistically significant difference from male data.]
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dents do not differ significantly. 43 One might hypothesize that the
very busy lawyer might not respond simply because he lacks the
time. One might also guess that the lawyer who is not earning much
money might not respond because he would be unwilling to disclose
his income. However, unless the females take some masochistic
pleasure in revealing their low incomes, one would assume that
these factors would affect the males and females in roughly the same
way.
A comparison of the average income of the men and women
from the classes of 1960 and 1957 reveals the improbable situation
which would have to exist before the returns of the silent 35%
would eliminate the observed income differential. If the male in-
come for the class of 1960 did not change with the addition of the
new 35%, the silent women would have to average $19,500 a year
to make their overall average match that of the men.44 Thus the
non-responding 1960 women graduates would have to have an aver-
age income approximately two and a half times greater than that
of their 90 classmates who did respond. The corresponding figure
for the class of 1957 is $27,800 a year, or nearly three times the in-
come of the responding women in the class of 1957.:1 It is incred-
ible that such differences would exist both between the men and
women who did not respond and between the respondents and non-
respondents.
43. See Exhibit 11 supra. Of course this fact suggests similar patterns of non-
response only if one assumes that males and females are equally spread throughout
the class.
44. The following calculations are based upon two assumptions: (1) that 60 females
from the sample in the class of 1960 failed to return questionnaires; (2) that the males
who failed to respond from the class of 1960 earned the same average salary as those
who did respond.
Calculation:
90 females returned surveys and averaged $8,000 income
60 females failed to reply
Males averaged $12,600 for the same year of graduation (1960)
Let Y = average income which the 60 non-responding females must earn to equalize
the total female average income with that of the males.
Then: 90 X $8,000 + 60 X Y = $12,600 X 150
Y = $19,500
45. The calculations below are based upon the assumptions made in note 44 supra
except ,that these figures are for those graduating in 1957.
Calculation:
86 females returned surveys and averaged $9,500 income
57 females failed to reply
Males averaged $16,800 for the same year of graduation (1960)
Let Y = average income which the 57 non-responding females must earn to equalize
the total female average income with that of the males.
Then: 86 x $9,500 + 57 X Y = $16,800 X 143
Y = $27,800
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G. Is the Male Sample Representative?
Since the female sample constitutes approximately 85% of all
the female graduates of all of the accredited law schools in the coun-
try in the time span covered, the female sample in a very real sense
is the female lawyer population of this period. The same of course
is not true of the males: the 2,151 males in the sample constitute
only a small part of the male graduates of the accredited law schools
in the period covered.46 Moreover, not all of the males were selected
on a truly random basis. We instructed each of the law schools from
whom we received male names to select them by picking one male
name from a class for each female name from that same class. Ap-
proximately 28% of all the males were selected by the truly random
method of taking the male name on the alphabetical class list next
following the female name. Another 25% were selected by methods
characterized as "random" by the law schools, but which may or may
not have been truly random methods of selection. 22% were selected
by unknown methods, and 24% were selected by taking a male
whose grade point was most nearly the same as that of the female
with whom he was matched.
Statistical comparisons of the males selected by taking the next
name on an alphabetical list with the males selected by the other
methods show no difference of statistical significance among the
four groups in income (either starting or present), in year of gradu-
ation, or in class standing. Of course this does not prove that the
male sample is precisely representative of all male law graduates, for
the sample has been selected from the schools and years from which
the female sample was drawn. If a larger percentage of all females
graduated from one group of law schools or classes, the male sample
will be disproportionately biased toward those schools and classes. 47
A conclusion that the male sample was so unrepresentative that
no income differential actually existed between women lawyers in
the classes of 1956 through 1964 and all male graduates of all law
schools in those years would require the same kind of improbable
assumption as was considered above.48 For example, the average
46. There were approximately 104,000 lawyers admitted to the bar during the
period between 1956-1965. Thus our male sample of 2,151 constitutes roughly 2% of
this group. See RANKIN & KROHNKE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 43. Figures from the 1964
Lawyer Statistical Report contain estimates for 1964-1965.
47. The male sample is slightly biased by the fact that it was chosen only from
schools which had female graduates. See note 5 supra for a list of schools which did
not have female graduates during the period of the study or which sent no names.
48. See notes 44 and 45 supra and accompanying text.
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income of all men in the class of 1956 would have to be about half
the average income of the males in the sample for the male-female
income differential to be eliminated. The size of the male sample
and the fact that it was collected by largely random methods from
approximately 100 of the 134 accredited law schools and from 10
classes makes it most unlikely that the sample differs by such a
large margin from the general male lawyer population.
Because the men who were randomly selected did not differ in
a statistically significant way from the other men in income, in year
of graduation, or in class standing, and since there were no other
facts which would indicate that the total male sample is not repre-
sentative, we have assumed for the purposes of the remainder of the
article that the males are representative of the male lawyer popula-
tion from the last ten years' graduating classes.
H. Evidence of Discrimination
As it is used in this article, "discrimination" includes every dif-
ferentiation, whether or not it is rational or functional. It includes
both the racist's selection of one of his own race in preference to a
more able member of another race and an ill person's selection of the
best neurosurgeon in preference to the next best one. Initial support
for the conclusion that the male-female income differential is caused
principally by discrimination against women comes from the fact
that our statistics rule out or render unlikely the other most plausible
explanations. On the basis of the figures and analysis set out above,
one can conclude with near certainty that the income differential
between the men and women was not caused by any of the following
factors: (1) the fact that women were employed only part time; (2) a
lack of experience on the part of the women lawyers; (3) lower class
rank and less law review participation by the women; (4) a difference
in schools attended; or (5) different types of employers. In addition,
the statistics and analysis indicate, although with less certainty, that
the income difference was not caused by (1) response bias among the
members of the sample; (2) differences between the general type of
work performed by the men and women; or (3) differences in the
type of jobs sought. If one rejects forgetfulness and lying as plausible
explanations for the large income differential which was observed,
he is left with only one plausible hypothesis49 to explain the income
49. If a disproportionate share of the females are Jewish, some of the income dif-
ferential may be explained by discrimination against them because they are Jewish.
Since the questionnaire did not collect any information on race, religion or ethnic
background, we could not calculate the effect, if any, of such discrimination, and,
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differential, namely discrimination on the bdsis of sex against women
lawyers by employers and clients.
A second and more direct piece of evidence of this discrimination
is the response of the 63 placement directors and deans who answered
our placement questionnaire: 6 stated that any discrimination against
female law graduates is "insignificant;" 43 believed that such dis-
crimination is "significant"; and 14 stated that it is "extensive."
These observers speak with authority and from long and extensive
experience with the interviewing and hiring processes at a number of
our busiest law school placement offices.50
Further evidence of discrimination is provided by the response
of women to the question: "Do you believe that you have been the
object of discrimination because of your sex by your present, former,
or by any potential employer from whom you sought a job?" The
following exhibit shows that more than half believe they probably
have been the object of such discrimination and that more than a
third are "certain" that they have been discriminated against.
EXHIBIT 15
BELIEFS OF FEMALES CONCERNING DISCRIMINATION
Per Cent of
Degree Females (N = 1148)
Certainly discriminated against 38.2%
Almost certainly 9.6%
Probably 17.6%
Probably not 15.8%
Certainly not 18.8%
Doubtless many disappointed female lawyers blame their lack of
success upon discrimination and, for that reason, the figures on the
above table should probably be discounted by a certain percentage.
The question gave the respondent an opportunity to say that she was
only "almost" certain or that it was only "probable" that she had
been discriminated against, yet 38% of the women chose to state that
they were "certain" that they had been the victims of discrimination.
In view of lawyers' notorious propensity to qualify and equivocate,
the absolute quality of these answers, made exclusively by lawyers
who had the opportunity to select several degrees of equivocation,
suggests that one should not discount the answers too greatly.51
absent data showing a disproportionate percentage of Jews among the females and
lacking evidence about the extent and effect of anti-Semitic discrimination against
lawyers, I have chosen to classify this hypothesis as "not plausible."
50. Among those indicating a belief that discrimination against women in hiring
is significant or extensive are representatives of the placement offices at six out of
the nine schools which we classified as prestige institutions.
51. The women who were most certain they had been discriminated against also
earned the least money. Perhaps this fact proves the accuracy of their opinion. On
the other hand, it may only indicate that their belief is a rationalization for low
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Finally, discrimination against women lawyers is suggested by the
female response to the question, "How many of each of the following
types of employers stated a policy to you against the hiring of women
as lawyers?" On 1,963 separate occasions, potential employers are
reported to have actually stated to a female respondent a policy
against the hiring of women lawyers. Even if we discount this num-
ber by a considerable margin, it still constitutes persuasive evidence
of employer discrimination on the basis of sex.
EXHIBIT 1652
EMPLOYERS WHO STATED A PoLicy AGAINST THE HIRING or WOMEN LAWYERS
Number of Number of
Statements of Women to Whom at
Discrimination Least One Statement
Type of Employer Policies Was Made
Law firm-3O and over 474 218
16 to 30 822 141
5 to 15 325 149
4 or under 271 125
Federal government 88 79
State & local government 95 63
Judges 78 52
Corporations 125 66
Banks & trust companies 111 56
Unions 22 5
Non-law jobs 52 28
Totals: 1963 982
It does not necessarily follow that one who states he has a policy
against the hiring of women in fact has and carries out such a policy.
income. The average present income of full-time employed women in relation to their
responses Tto the discrimination question is as follows:
1964 INCOaM
Classes of Classes of Classes of
Discrimination 1956-58 1959-61 1962-65
"certain" $8,700 $7,000 $6,400
balance of responses $9,100 $8,100 $6,600
52. The large ratio of reported statements of a discrimination policy to the total
number of interviews is consistent with our data in some cases but inconsistent with
other data which we have collected. As indicated in Exhibit 3 supra, the percentage of
female lawyers finding an initial job with a law firm of 30 or more is not statistically
different from the percentage of males finding jobs with that employer. If these firms
in fact discriminate as extensively as the reported policies would indicate, it is
diffcult to understand how such a large percentage of females could find employ-
ment with them. The explanation may lie in the fact that some other firms of 30
or more in fact hire more than their proportionate share of females. Since females
make up less than 3% of the lawyer population, anyone who has 30 to 50 employees
and who hires two women will have employed a higher percentage of the female
lawyer population than of the male lawyer population, and thus will have offset some-
what the aggregate discrimination. Another explanation may be found by an exami-
nation of the positions which women hold with those firms. Some women may have
responded that law firms who in fact hire women for second-class positions never-
theless have a "policy against hiring women."
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However, one can imagine few circumstances under which it would
be beneficial for the employer to state a policy of discrimination
which he did not practice. In some southern societies, the pressure
to discriminate against Negroes might be so great that even one who
did not oppose Negroes would feel compelled to express opposition,
but surely the pressure to discriminate against women has not
reached such a pitch.
The combination of this evidence-the apparent failure of other
hypotheses to explain the income differential, the statements of the
placement officers and deans, the opinions of the female respondents,
and finally the reported statements of the employers themselves-
convinces me that discrimination against women lawyers by their
potential employers is at least a substantial cause, and probably the
principal cause, for the income differential which we have observed
between men and women.
III. Is THE DISCRIMINATION FUNCTIONAL?
For present purposes, discrimination by any private employer
may be considered functional to the extent that it is likely to produce
a greater economic gain for him than he would have received had he
not so discriminated. For example, the failure of the Green Bay
Packers to select women as defensive linemen is discrimination, yet
it is entirely functional and appropriate; women do not exhibit the
massive size, strong backs, and powerful limbs which are the requi-
sites of the position. Similarly, women may have psychological or
intellectual limitations which make them less effective lawyers than
are men. If this is true, some or all of the discrimination against
women lawyers is functional and, perhaps, defensible.
Because the qualifications of a defensive lineman are relatively
simple and obvious, it is easy to tell which discriminations in selec-
tions for that position are dictated by its function and which are not.
However, there is no such agreement about the necessary, or even the
desirable, attributes of an "effective lawyer." Indeed, such attributes
are kaleidoscopic, elusive, and difficult to generalize. At one end of
the legal spectrum is the lawyer who does nothing but appear before
juries; at the other end is the man employed by a governmental
agency or a very large firm who is an expert on some obscure and
complex statute or body of law. The latter in his relish for and
mastery of the statutory intricacies resembles the scholar; the former
in his enjoyment of the pomp and show of the courtroom resembles
the actor. The same personal characteristics which are vital to the
success of one of these men would spell the doom of the other. And
between these two extremes lie 300,000 American lawyers who ex-
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hibit infinitely varied mixtures of a number of roles, including actor,
scholar, and counselor.
Nonetheless, it probably is possible to identify a few characteris-
tics which are desirable for the performance of every lawyer function
(for example, intelligence), and others which would be helpful to
sizeable slices of the legal profession (for example, ability to inspire
confidence in clients). The data produced by this study are not exten-
sive, but they do provide a basis for comparing men and women as to
certain of these functional attributes-intelligence, emotional suit-
ability, probable length of service, and ability to inspire confidence
in clients.
A. Intelligence
Both class standing and law review participation probably bear
a direct relation to intelligence.53 These are two common indicators
of intellectual ability used by employers, who often specify that only
persons on law review or with certain grades or class standing may
apply for jobs with them. The data provide no basis for discrimina-
tion against women on either of these grounds. There was no statis-
tically significant difference between the men and women in either
class standing or law review participation.5
B. Emotional Suitability
I know of no data which give a suitable inventory of the emo-
tional makeup of women lawyers, nor do I know of any which com-
pare female lawyers either with other women or with male lawyers.55
Absent a systematic psychological inventory, one should take care to
avoid two inviting errors in analyzing the emotional composition
of women lawyers. The first is to attribute the common characteristics
of all women to that tiny percentage of women who happen to be
lawyers. One random selection of 15,663 female college graduates
netted only 44 who were going to become lawyers.56 Whatever the
process which culled out these 44, it is a hasty judgment which says
that they exhibit all of the attributes of the remaining 15,619. On
the contrary, it is entirely possible that "women" exhibit certain
58. Since law review participation is usually determined in part by class standing,
the former may be only an additional indication of the latter's effect.
54. See Exhibit 11 supra.
55. Alice S. Rossi, who is with the National Opinion Research Center at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, is conducting a study of a large sample of female college graduates.
This study should ultimately produce information about the characteristics of women
who undertake practice in the traditional male professions, but it probably will not
give specific information about female lawyers.
56. This sample is random in the sense that it was chosen from colleges which
were randomly selected.
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attributes and that "women lawyers" exhibit substantially different
ones. The second error is to color all 7,000 female lawyers with the
attributes of one or two of them. Since women make up no more
than 3%o of the bar, it is possible to engage actively in practice and
yet not have extensive contact with women lawyers. Nevertheless,
I have quizzed few lawyers or law teachers who did not have definite,
and often outspoken, views about the emotional composition of that
group, although often these generalizations are based on only a hand-
ful of experiences with one or two women lawyers. Since this study is
limited to women who are lawyers and includes approximately 1,300
of them, it suffers from neither of these errors.
Two areas of our study-one dealing with trial practice and the
other with motives for attending law school-yielded information
which is relevant to the question of emotional suitability. First, the
idea that women shrink from the combat of litigation is not sup-
ported by the data, which show that the women appeared in court
with nearly the same frequency as did the men. 7 Seven per cent of
the full-time employed women listed "litigation" as the type of work
(singular) they performed; 7.2% of the men listed litigation. More-
over, 45.6% of all the females in full-time private practice stated
that they engaged in litigation 58 and 27.7% stated that they did
criminal work. The study did not compare male and female suc-
cess in litigation, but it showed at a minimum that a sizeable body
of the women were actively engaged in trial practice.
It is sometimes suggested that women are less able at certain kinds
of practice because, unlike men, they are not motivated by a whole-
some ambition to earn money and get ahead. However, the thought
that women are exclusively or even principally motivated to enter
law by "bleeding heart" motives or that they are untouched by
crasser motives is contradicted by the data discussed above. 9
57. The difference between the average number of court appearances made by
the males and the females is statistically significant.
AVERAGE NUMBER OF COURT APPEARANCES PER YEAR
Year Graduated Females Males
1964 2.4 4.1
1963 4.0 7.7
1962 5.8 7.9
1961 9.2 10.0
1960 7.4 9.2
1959 9.6 10.2
1958 7.3 9.1
1957 7.8 10.5
1956 8.2 10.3
58. See text at note 18 supra for a discussion of the ambiguities in the definition
of "litigation."
59. See text at pages 1069-70 supra.
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We know far too little about the psychological composition of the
female lawyer to state with certainty how she differs from other
females or from male lawyers. Clearly some current ideas about the
female lawyer's psychological composition cannot be empirically
supported. Such incidental data as the study produced on motives
for attending law school and frequency of court appearance should
inspire a vigorous skepticism about other notions concerning a
woman's emotional suitability for various kinds of practice.
C. Probable Length of Service
It is often stated that a woman is a less desirable employee-lawyer
than is a male because she will quit working to get married, to have
a child, or to devote more time to her family just when she is gaining
sufficient experience to be a valuable employee. The data show that
many women had changed jobs several times at the time they an-
swered the questionnaire and that a larger share of the women than
men had ceased practice entirely.6 0 However, they do not support
the common expectation that there is a vast difference between male
and female performance on this point. Rather, the striking thing
about the data is that both men and women changed jobs quite fre-
quently. At the end of three years, only 30% of the males in the class
of 1962 and 29% of the females in that class were still at their first
jobs. At the end of seven years, the corresponding percentages fall to
14.5% and 11.1% respectively. Except for the class of 1959, the per-
centage of women in each class who were still at their first jobs at the
time they answered the questionnaire did not differ from the corre-
sponding percentage of the males by a statistically significant margin.
However, if the men from all classes are compared with all of the
women, the difference is statistically significant. [Exhibit 17]
As is indicated in Exhibit 18, a significantly larger percentage of
women than men had left their second jobs, in four of eight classes.
The fact that the male turnover with respect to the second job is
lower by a significant margin in the three oldest classes might suggest
that this job turnover differential grows wider with the passage of
time, as more women leave practice because of growing family
commitments. Yet the first job data show no such trend, and the
number of women permanently re-entering practice after a spell of
child-rearing and housekeeping may actually cause a reduction in
turnover among female lawyers who have been out of law school for
60. Exhibit 8 supra shows that only 65.5% of the female respondents reported
that they were in full-time practice and that 85.5% of the males reported that they
were in full-time practice.
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EXHIBIT 17
JOB MOVEMENT
(Still at First Job in 1965-No Job Changes)
Females
1963 1962 1961 "1960 1959 1958 195f 1956
Year Graduated
EXHIBIT 18
JOB MOVEMENT
(Still at Second Job in 1965-1 Job Change)
P. . . Males
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I
% I
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more than ten years. The data give us no reliable answers to these
questions.
In summary, our gross data show a slightly greater female job
turnover in the first job after law school;" 1 they also suggest that job
turnover of women is higher than that for men thereafter. Moreover,
if a large share of the female non-respondents are housewives,6 2 and if
no corresponding percentage of the male non-respondents are not
working, the actual job turnover of all female lawyers may be even
higher than that reflected in our data.
But, even if the total female job turnover is higher than our data
suggest, that fact alone does not prove that a woman is a less desirable
employee than is a man, for high turnover can result from many
causes. It can be caused by employee fickleness, but it can also be
caused by poor pay or other inadequacies of the job. If women are
as effective lawyers as are men but are nevertheless paid less money
than are comparably employed men, one might expect women to
seek new jobs more frequently. On the other hand, some of the stan-
dard female motivations for job change-the urge to motherhood,
the need to devote time to one's family or to move with one's husband
to a new location-are all peculiar to women and may be less subject
to control by employer offers of more money and greater status than
are the typical male motivations for job change. Without informa-
tion indicating which changes are caused by employer discrimination
and which are caused by the demands of a husband or a family, high
job turnover neither proves nor disproves that discrimination against
women is functional. The naked statistic of frequent job change is
equally consistent with either hypothesis.
The data do explode the myth that few married women and no
mothers practice law. Few women ceased work because of marriage
alone,63 and more than 25 % of the full-time employed women were
mothers of small children. One can only guess how many more might
work full time if more employers tailored positions so that the hours
and responsibilities were compatible with a mother's other responsi-
bilities.
61. Because the sample was not large enough, we could not make a meaningful
comparison of female turnover by type of job. Such data might reveal quite different
patterns among jobs and between male and female employees depending upon the
type of job.
62. We have no reason to believe either that they are or are not.
63. See text at note 24 and Exhibit 8 supra.
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D. Client Confidence
Every law firm, except one with a shrinking practice, has the
problem of transferring a client's sometimes fragile allegiance from
senior men to competent younger men without losing the client's
patronage. If the young lawyer is a Jew, a Negro, or a woman, this
problem may be aggravated by the clients' own prejudices. 6 4 One of
the most frequently stated fears about women lawyers is that clients
will not place their confidence in them. Our data did indicate that
women see fewer clients than do men by a statistically significant
margin. This difference was particularly great among those who were
employed by large firms and who had been out of law school for four
or more years.
Despite this statistically significant difference in the frequency of
client contact, the data do not really support the conclusion that
clients will not place their confidence in women lawyers. First, it is
not possible to tell from our data whether the lower frequency of
female client contact was due to clients' resistance or to mistaken
beliefs of women lawyers and their employers about client resistance.
Second, the data show a very substantial amount of client contact on
the part of women employed by corporations and by firms of 15 or
under. If the hypothesis about client resistance were correct, one
would expect women to be concentrated in jobs which required little
or no client contact. Yet in the smaller firms and corporations, women
saw approximately seven clients for every ten seen by men.
Of course these data do not prove that all clients will place their
confidence in a woman lawyer as readily as in a male lawyer. The
figures tell nothing about the kind of clients which the women saw.
Perhaps they were spread across the spectrum of legal practice, but
they may have been concentrated in the probate and domestic rela-
tions field.0 5 Furthermore, the figures do not indicate whether the
clients were satisfied with the service, nor do they indicate whether
the employers had to undertake a more extensive and careful intro-
duction than would have been required with a male. They do show,
however, that any vision of the woman as exclusively a back-room
and library worker is badly distorted.
64. Despite the fact that employer discrimination based on clients' prejudices is
functional, it has been prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See text at notes
79-82 infra.
65. Some members of the bar assume that probate and domestic relations clients
find female counsel more acceptable than other clients do. One can question why these
clients should react differently to female lawyers than do others.
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E. The Weight of the Evidence
The survey did not solicit conclusive or comprehensive data on
the question whether discrimination against women lawyers is func-
tional. It tells us nothing about the relative ability of men and
women to acquire clients or about the importance of that function
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to employers. Moreover, the information on court appearances and
frequency of client contact fall far short of the systematic psycho-
logical inventory which we need in order even to begin evaluating
the contention that discrimination against women lawyers is func-
tional. Nonetheless, the information which the survey did gather
makes some of the stoutest citadels in the rational discrimination
fortress look vulnerable. "Women can't stand the rigors of trial
practice"-but the full-time employed women appeared in court
nearly as often as did the men. "Clients won't put up with a
woman"-- but, except in one kind of practice, the women saw seven
clients for every ten that men saw. "Women quit work to marry and
have children"-but 27% of the full-time employed women were
married and had children. "Women lawyers are just bleeding hearts
who do not understand the usual business motives"-but equally as
many men admitted the importance of the "bleeding heart" motive
and a large share of the women rated monetary motives very impor-
tant in their choice of law as a career. These data have convinced me
that much of the enormous income differential between the males
and females is attributable to nonfunctional discrimination.
IV. FoRcEs FOR CHANGE
A. Goals
To avoid wasting his resources in fruitless and unjustified causes,
and in order to nurture the support of the largest possible segment of
American society, one who attacks discrimination should select his
particular goals with some care. Surely few enlightened persons in
twentieth-century America will support any substantial nonfunc-
tional employment discrimination against any group in our society
-whether it be Jews, Negroes, or women-and therefore most
would agree that the elimination of nonfunctional discrimination
against women lawyers is an appropriate goal. Some would go further
and seek the elimination of nearly all employment discrimination
based on sex, whether functional or not. For example, the guide-
lines of the Equal Opportunity Commission, published under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, come close to prohibiting all sex discrimina-
tion, including some which may ultimately prove to be functional.6
I would urge a goal which falls short of the elimination of all sex
discrimination in employment, but which goes beyond a mere attack
on proved nonfunctional discrimination. Because I believe that most
of the sex discrimination is not functional, and because we are not
likely soon to get definitive data on whether or not it is, I would
66. For a discussion of these guidelines, see text at notes 79-95 infra.
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establish a presumption that, until proved otherwise, all discrimina-
tion against female lawyers is not functional and I would counsel an
attack on all such discrimination except for that which has been
proved to be functional. In addition, and irrespective of its func-
tional nature, I would urge an attack on that peculiar kind of dis-
crimination which is based upon clients' or employees' prejudices.
As a general proposition, I see no merit in striking down func-
tional discrimination in hiring against the female lawyer. 7 This
discrimination stands on no different footing than a variety of other
discriminations which the employer routinely makes on the basis
of grades, experience, school, and personality.0 8 If, for example, an
employer were able to prove that, despite equal treatment, women
were more likely to leave a given position than were men, I would
permit him to consider that fact in his employment formula. One
may argue that each woman must be considered "on her own merits"
and that the characteristics of female lawyers-even the proved and
undisputed characteristics-should not be attributed to any single
individual. However, that argument begs the question, for a woman's
relevant physical and psychic attributes are no less "her merits" than
67. Because an employer may use probabilities in making his hiring decisions, it
does not necessarily follow that he should be permitted to use probabilities in es-
tablishing the terms or conditions of employment. That is another and more complex
problem.
68. Arguments for the prohibition of functional sex discrimination will have a
familiar sound to one who has considered the current issue of preferential treatment
for the Negro. In many cases the other side of the preferential treatment coin is
prohibition of a functional discrimination against the Negro; likewise prohibition
of functional sex discrimination may mean preferential treatment for the female.
Whatever their merit in the Negro's case, the arguments given to support Negro
preference do not justify female preference. Kaplan, in his article Equal Justice in an
Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-the Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 363, 364-66 (1966), summarizes these arguments as follows: (1) without special
help Negroes will be condemned to a perpetual deprivation in a functionally discrimi-
nating society; (2) Negroes, like the handicapped, should be treated according to their
current need; (3) white society has an obligation to atone for past exploitations; (4) it
is in society's self-interest to give preferential treatment to the Negro and thus benefit
from the potential which will be so realized; and (5) it is in society's interest to give
the Negro special treatment in order to avoid the kind of explosive and dangerous
conflict which the past several years' riots suggest is in store for us.
Arguments 1, 2, and 4 all assume that the persons against whom the discrimina-
tion is directed are functionally and substantially inferior. However, there is nothing
to suggest that the female lawyer suffers from any such substantial functional in-
feriority by comparison with her male counterpart. She has had training in the same
schools from kindergarten through law school and to our knowledge she comes from
no different environment or soco-economic background than does the male. Thus
we have no basis from which we could assume that she will be eternally deprived if
she does not get help, that she has any special need, or that her potential for society
cannot be realized simply by the elimination of nonfunctional discrimination.
Since the "social dynamite" argument does not apply to the woman lawyer, one
has only the slender reed of the obligation arising from past inequities upon which to
base an argument for preferential female treatment. As indicated in the text, it is
my judgment that this argument alone is not sufficient to justify female preference in
light of all of the problems which that would bring.
[Vol. 65:10511096
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the grades of the D student are "his merits." In a given case, the
generalization that women will behave in a certain way can be wrong,
but the same is true of the generalization that all D students are intel-
lectually inept. Moreover, since by definition there will be some
economic cost to the employer if he must cease functional discrimina-
tion, he can be expected more strongly to resist the cessation of func-
tional discriminations than nonfunctional ones. It is not at all clear
that the combined powers available to attack discrimination can
eradicate even nonfunctional sex discrimination in the foreseeable
future; how much smaller are the chances if the attack is widely
spread out and there is a justifiable basis for opposition.
Secondary discrimination-that rationalized on the basis of one's
clients' or employees' discrimination-is a different breed of cat. It
differs from most other functional discriminations in two ways: (1) it
is a half-breed, part functional and part nonfunctional; and (2) it
will often be subject to change or mitigation by the employer.
The first point can be illustrated by comparing two hypothetical
discriminations. Assume first that women prove to be less able nego-
tiators than men and, therefore, functionally inferior labor lawyers.
From every viewpoint, that of the employer, the opposing lawyer, the
client, and the distinterested third party, they will appear to be func-
tionally inferior. Compare this with the case of "secondary discrimi-
nation" based upon a client's unwillingness to have a woman as his
lawyer. From the employer's viewpoint, the discrimination against
the woman in this case is perfectly functional; he must please his
clients and any employee who cannot promote that objective does
not perform his function properly. But, if one views this case from
the vantage point of an opposing lawyer, an unprejudiced client, or
a disinterested third party, it is a nonfunctional discrimination since
here our hypothetical female lawyer can negotiate and carry on all of
the other lawyer functions as effectively as can a man-her only flaw
lies in the prejudice of the client. Thus, although this discrimination
is functional from the employer's point of view, I would select the
vantage point of the disinterested third party and treat secondary
discrimination as basically nonfunctional.
The second difference between secondary discriminations and
other functional discriminations also arises from the fact that the
sources of the two discriminations are different. Since secondary dis-
crimination springs from the attitudes of employees and clients, it is
more readily amenable to change than are those sex discriminations
which inhere in the female's peculiar physical or psychic composi-
tion. An employer can exercise some control over his employees; he
1097AprU 1967]
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may also be able to influence the attitudes of his clients. At a mini-
mum, he can take extra pains in introducing the woman to the client
and can use extra care in selecting the clients which she is to serve.
Because secondary discrimination is thus subject to his change and
control, the cost to the employer of ceasing it may not be as high as
if he were asked to discontinue other functional discriminations;
with respect to secondary discrimination, the employer can mitigate
and perhaps avoid the loss, whereas, in the case of other functional
discriminations, we would simply be asking him to absorb the loss.
For two reasons, then-because it is fundamentally nonfunctional
and because it is subject to some change by the employer-secondary
discrimination should be a target of attack.
Thus, I propose these goals: first, to eliminate all sex discrimina-
tion in employment which cannot be shown to be functional; and
second, to eliminate functional discrimination in the special case in
which it is based upon the nonfunctional discrimination of clients
or employees.
B. Further Study
An important step in mobilizing society's opinion to combat a
discrimination is to convince society that the discrimination is an
unfair one. One has only to demonstrate that a discrimination exists
against Negroes or Jews and a substantial segment of American
opinion will assume that such discrimination is not functional and
therefore unfair. However, it is doubtful that nearly as large a seg-
ment of American society is willing to make the same assumption
about discrimination against women. The physical difference be-
tween males and females is more fundamental than that which exists
between Jews and non-Jews or between Negroes and Caucasians.
Because of this physical difference and the attendant requirements
of motherhood, certain discriminations against women may be func-
tional and appropriate. Moreover, some respected scholars hold the
view that women have fundamental psychic differences from men,69
and surely a large segment of American opinion agrees with this
view.
Thus, if one is to call forth the kind of reaction on behalf of
women which the past quarter century has seen on behalf of Negroes,
he probably will have to demonstrate that these physical and psychic
69. See, e.g., Bettelheim, The Commitment Required of a Woman Entering a
Scientific Profession in Present-Day American Society, in MATrFELn & VAN AxEN,
WOMEN & THE SCIENTIFIC PROFESSIONS 3 (1965); Erikson, Inner & Outer Space: Reflec-
tions on Womanhood, 93 DAEDILUS 581 (1964).
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differences, if they exist, either do not justify any discrimination or
do not justify the amount of discrimination which presently exists.
Perhaps the magnitude of discrimination which has been displayed
on the foregoing pages will persuade many (as it did me) that neither
the physical nor psychic differences between males and females, even
operating at their maximum possible effect, could justify such dis-
crimination. But, to the skeptical, neither the magnitude of this
discrimination nor the fragmentary evidence which we have collected
concerning its nonfunctional basis will be persuasive. Thus, a thor-
ough and sophisticated study of the effectiveness of women as lawyers
is needed.
Among other things, such a study should:
(1) make a thorough psychological inventory of the female lawyer
and compare it with a similar male lawyer inventory;
(2) systematically investigate the reaction of all varieties of clients
to female lawyers;
(3) study female court appearances and compare their success
with that of males;
(4) examine the comparative ability of females and males to at-
tract clients; and
(5) study the reasons which cause males and females to leave
various jobs.
The results of such a study might not be conclusive, but they
would give a sound basis for estimating the extent to which dis-
crimination against women lawyers is functional. Such a study might
also produce more sophisticated culling devices for distinguishing
between those who are going to be effective lawyers and those who
are not. Finally, it might reveal areas of peculiar female expertise
which are not now commonly recognized.
C. Present Legislation
The federal government and many of the states now have legisla-
tion which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in certain
circumstances.70 The federal law is embodied in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 703 of that act prohibits an em-
ployer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
70. For a current listing of state anti-discrimination statutes which deal with sex,
see CCH Ehm .. P ,cr. GumE 1400 (July 26, 1966).
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origin .. . . 71 After July 2, 1968, that provision will apply to most
employers of twenty-five or more persons who are "engaged in an
industry affecting commerce ....- 72
This language surely reaches the many lawyers who are employees
of covered corporations. In addition, the General Counsel of the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission has ruled that law
firms with the requisite number of employees are covered by the
act.7 3 The statutory language and the analogous cases support this
conclusion. By a two-step process, Congress adopted for Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the broad jurisdictional sweep of the
National Labor Relations Act74 which the Supreme Court has sum-
marized as follows: "Congress intended to and did vest in the [Na-
tional Labor Relations] Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth con-
stitutionally permissible under the commerce clause."75 It is difficult
to conceive of a law firm of twenty-five employees which does not
exhibit those miniscule interstate contacts necessary to "affect com-
merce" and thus invoke the coverage of the commerce clause of the
71. 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). The proponent of the amend-
ment covering sex was Howard Smith, Democrat from Virginia, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, and arch-foe of the bill. One can question the sincerity
of Congressman Smith's protestations that concern for the "minority sex" was his
sole motivation, 110 CONG. RmC. 2577 (1964). Congressman Smith may have had just
a tinge of hope that the proposal would cause dissention among the bill's proponents.
In fact, the supporters of the bill did disagree over the sex issue; Emmanuel Celler
of New York opposed the amendment but found himself pitted against Mrs. Martha
Griffiths of Michigan and several of her female colleagues. Mrs. Griffiths eventually
won, and the amendment was passed 168 to 133. 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964).
72. 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-Definitions (1964).
73. His ruling [in the form reported in CCH EMPL. PRAcr. GuMDE 17,304.18
(Sept. 23, 1966)] is as follows:
Finally, with respect to your inquiry regarding law firms, the fact that the
firm renders legal assistance to clients engaged in interstate commerce would,
in the opinion of the Commission, be sufficient to determine that the law firm
is engaged in an "industry affecting commerce" and therefore subject to the
provisions set forth in Title VII. Cf. NLRB v. National Survey, Inc., [53 LC
11,165] 361 F.2d 199, 204 (CA 7, 1966).
As to the treatment of junior partners of a law firm, we have not as yet had
occasion to pass on a particular fact situation, but we incline to the view that
the term "partner" is not decisive if their perquisites and tenure are more con-
sistent with the status of employee than of co-owner of the enterprise.
74. Section 701(h) of the Civil Rights Act defines "industry affecting commerce"
to include "any activity or industry .. .within the meaning of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959." Section 3(c) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act in turn incorporates the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act by the following language:
"[1]ndustry affecting commerce" means any activity, business, or industry in
commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or
the free flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry "affecting com-
merce" within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as
amended, or the Railway Labor Act, as amended. 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 402 (1964).
75. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963).
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Constitution; 76 the typical firm of that size will represent many clients
who do business in several states, and most such firms frequently will
represent clients outside their own states.
There will probably be a few skirmishes on the jurisdictional
grounds discussed above, but if there is to be a real battle, it will be
waged over the scope and meaning of the two provisions which per-
mit certain kinds of discrimination against women. These are section
703(e), which permits discrimination on the basis of a "bona fide
occupational qualification," and subsection (h) of the same section,
which specifically allows discrimination based upon "quantity or
quality of production .... -77 In enacting the former subsection, Con-
gress doubtless had in mind such clear cases as discrimination against
women in the selection of professional football players or the dis-
crimination against men in the selection of brassiere models. With
respect to the latter subsection, Congress was probably most con-
cerned with merit pay provisions in blue collar work. Yet both
sections may ultimately find application in the female lawyer's case.78
76. See, e.g., Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLR.B, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). Compare the tighter jurisdictional requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act as applied in Mitchell v. Lublin, 358 U.S. 207 (1959) (archi-
tectural and engineering firm); Rausch v. Wolf, 72 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ill. 1947) (CPA
firm), But cf. Harder v. Anderson, 173 F. Supp. 135 (D. Minn. 1959) (CPA firm).
77. Sec. 703(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees, for an employment agency to dassify, or refer for employment any
individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or
refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other train-
ing or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such pro-
gram, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise ....
Sec. 703(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production ....
78 Stat. 256 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 20OOe-2(e), (h) (1964).
78. A final objection to the application of the act to the case of the female lawyer
is found in the last sentence of § 703(h), which reads as follows: "It shall not be an
unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer to differentiate on
the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to
be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the
provisions of Section 206(d) of Title 29." (Emphasis added.) Section 206(d) is part of
the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act. "Professional" em-
ployees, e.g., lawyer-employees, are excluded from the minimum wage provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act by § 213 of that act. Thus if one reads the words "differ-
entiation ... authorized by ... 206(d)" to be equivalent to "differentiation not pro-
hibited under the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act," he
can conclude that lawyers are not covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Such an interpretation of the reference in § 703 to the minimum wage exclusions
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An examination of the following four questions which may arise
in many employment situations will illustrate the application of the
occupational discrimination provisions and will illuminate some of
the interpretative difficulties with those provisions: (1) Does the re-
fusal to hire a woman on the ground of clients' unwillingness to deal
with her constitute a bona fide occupational discrimination which is
permissible under the act? (2) May an employer legally require higher
credentials of a female applicant than of a male if he has reliable data
from which he can predict that a female will be a somewhat less desir-
able employee than a male (for reasons other than client resistance)?
(3) May a firm maintain "female" positions which bear less respon-
sibility and demand less skill but which also offer less pay than other
positions which are open to males? (4) Must firms treat women
equally even to the extent of allowing them to compete for places in
the partnership?
1. Does the refusal to hire a female on the ground of clients' un-
willingness to deal with her constitute a bona fide occupational dis-
crimination which is permissible under the act? The guidelines say
no: "Refusal to hire because of the preference of co-workers, the
employer, clients or customers.. ." is not a bona fide occupational
discrimination.79 The act itself is less specific; its language permnits
discrimination against one lacking "qualification[s] reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise .... .o Thus, one may argue that a woman lacks a qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of this particular job-.
namely, the ability to inspire confidence in the firm's clients.
However, Congress surely did not intend the act's exception to be
read so broadly. The words "occupational" and "operation" direct
one's attention to the performance of a function, not to the reaction
is inaccurate for several reasons. First, § 703 permits discrimination which is "author-
ized" by the provisions of a specific section of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
only discriminations "authorized" by that section (§ 206d) are the four listed
there-those based on seniority, merit systems, differing quantity or quality of pro-
duction, or factors other than sex. A second reason for rejecting the argument that
lawyers are not covered by the Civil Rights Act is that Congress could have excluded
them simply and directly by stating that anyone who is excepted from the minimum
wage coverage by § 213 of the Fair Labor Standards Act is excepted from the provi-
sions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, the physical position of
the reference to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the legislative history on this point,
and the ruling of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission all support the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to give a blanket exception for all types of
employment which are excepted under the Fair Labor Standards Act but instead
intended only to dovetail the seniority and merit systems exceptions of the Civil
Rights Act with those in the Fair Labor Sandards Act.
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(1)(c) (1966).
80. 78 Stat. 256 (1964). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
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of a third party to that performance. Furthermore, the sentence
contains several restrictive adjectives and phrases: it applies only
"in those certain instances" where there are "bona fide" qualifica-
tions "reasonably necessary" to the operation of that "particular"
enterprise. The care with which Congress has chosen the words to
emphasize the function and to limit the scope of the exception indi-
cates that it had no intention of opening the kind of enormous gap
in the law which would exist if an employer could legitimately dis-
criminate against a group solely because his employees, customers,
or clients discriminated against that group. Absent much more ex-
plicit language, such a broad exception should not be assumed, for
it would largely emasculate the act. Finally, the legislative history
supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to permit dis-
crimination on the basis of the discrimination of one's clients or
customers.81 Thus, a firm's refusal to hire a woman on the ground
that she would be unacceptable to its clients would be a violation of
the act.8 2
2. May an employer legally require higher credentials of a female
applicant than of a male if he has reliable data from which he can
predict that a female will be a somewhat less desirable employee than
a male (for reasons other than client resistance)? The guidelines
prohibit an employer from refusing to hire a woman on the basis of
a single past experience. "The bona fide occupational qualification"
does not permit "the refusal to hire a woman because of her sex
based on the assumption of comparative employment characteristics
of women in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover
rate among women is higher than men."8 3 If our employer's sole past
experience had been with one woman, his judgment would probably
constitute no more than an "assumption" concerning the "charac-
teristics of women" lawyers. If he based his "refusal" exclusively on
the female applicant's sex, he would fall squarely within the guide-
lines and his actions would properly be found to be in violation of
the act.
Two slight modifications of the case raise the problem posed by
question 2. First, assume that the employer does not absolutely refuse
to hire women, but, because he believes that they have a greater
81. The congressional debates suggest that the proponents of the bill intended
that the bona fide occupational qualification clause be read narrowly. See, e.g., 110
CONG. Rac. 2550; id. at 7212, 7213, 7217 (memorandum of Mr. Clark).
82. In this and the following four hypotheticals, we have assumed that the firm
has sufficient employees to be covered by the act.
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(1)(a) (1966).
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propensity to leave the job earlier than men, he requires somewhat
better credentials from them than he would require of males. (For
example, he will consider men whose grade average is 3.0 and better
but he requires a minimum grade point of 3.2 for women.) Thus
the fact that an applicant is a woman is not the basis for outright
refusal but is only one factor among several in his employment
formula. Second, assume that the prospective employer possesses
data which give him a broader and more reliable basis for his belief
that women are more likely than men to leave a given job.
In construing the guideline, the first interpretive problem is
defining the phrase "refusal to hire because of sex." It is not clear
whether the guidelines use this phrase to describe only the case in
which sex is an absolute bar to employment or to describe also the
situation in which the employer gives some lesser weight to sex and
allows it to be offset by other positive features of the applicant. One
seeking only to maximize the efficiency of his employees could reason-
ably require that a woman have better grades or come from a better
school than a man before he was willing to take a proved risk that
she would leave his employ. I would urge the interpretation of the
statute and the guidelines to permit the employer to discriminate
against a female to the extent that sound data about female functional
disabilities show such discrimination to be necessary for him to
maximize the efficiency of his employees.
The second interpretive difficulty is defining the word "assump-
tion." Since refusals to hire cannot be based upon "assumptions"
about women, if "assumption" is used to mean all generalizations
based upon past experience, the employer would be denied the right
to consider the probability that a woman would leave even if he has
had extensive experience showing that women of her kind are ten
times more likely to leave a job than are men. Such an interpreta-
tion is suggested by the language of the guidelines: "[I]ndividuals
[should be] considered on the basis of individual capacities and not
on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group."8 4
This interpretation would deny the employer the right to generalize
about women in the same way that he routinely generalizes about
persons with certain class standings, from certain schools, and with
certain personalities. For the reasons discussed above,8 5 it seems to me
that such a reading is undesirable and that one should give the word
iassumption" its ordinary meaning-namely, a generalization made
without a sufficient foundation of supporting experience.
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(1)(b) (1966).
85. See notes 67 & 68 supra and accompanying text.
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If the words "assumption" and "refusal" are defined as I have
suggested, the employer will be permitted to consider a woman's sex
as one of the factors in his employment formula as long as he has a
sound basis for predicting that women will be functionally inferior
lawyers and provided that he does not give the factor of sex greater
weight in his formula than is necessary to offset that factor.86
3. May a firm maintain "female" positions which bear less re-
sponsibility and demand less skill but which also offer less pay than
other positions which are open to males? Some law firms have "per-
manent associate" positions. Assume that a hypothetical firm has
several such positions which have been held by women who have
been paid less than regular associates with comparable seniority.
Their work has been limited to keeping the firm docket, doing re-
search, and doing a limited amount of drafting. The employees who
fill these positions do not and are not expected to work as long hours
as are the other associates. Assume finally that one of these jobs is
now open; may our employer advertise it as a "woman lawyer"
position?
The guidelines state that it is "an unlawful employment prac-
tice" to qualify a job as "male" or "female" or "to maintain separate
lines of progression or separate seniority lists based on sex where this
would adversely affect any employee unless sex is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for that job."87 If the job is offered only to
women and if the other associate jobs are not open to them, the
employer has probably violated the act by establishing male and fe-
male jobs with differing privileges and pay. However, the act does not
prohibit the classification of various jobs in accordance with their
utility and value to the employer.88 Therefore, if the job were classi-
fied as one which carried lower pay and had fewer rights but was
open to males and females alike, the discrimination would be per-
86. Determining the appropriate weight for the sex factor and deciding whether
a given employer has given it only that amount of weight are not small tasks. Indeed,
in some cases they may be impossible tasks. For guidance one might look to the
particular employer's treatment of other factors in his employment formula and to
other employers' treatment of the sex factor. Yet much of the balancing of various
factors in deciding whom to employ is done subconsciously, and even the cooperative
employer may not be able to assign a specific value to the various factors which he
considers. Perhaps the only solution is to presume that every employer is giving
undue weight to the sex factor and to permit him to bring forward evidence to prove
his good faith. Of course, this may simply mean that no employer can practice func-
tional discrimination until he has proved his good faith by employing or offering
employment to females.
87. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1966).
88. § 703(h), 78 Stat. 256 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). See note 77 supra
for the text of the provision.
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missible as long as it were not simply a ruse to discriminate against
women. 9
4. Must firms treat females equally even to the extent of allowing
them to compete for places in the partnership? Assume that our em-
ployer offers a job to a woman with the understanding that she will
receive the same advancement and pay as any male associate of equal
ability, but that she will never become a partner. This means that she
will not have the responsibilities and concerns of a partner but it
also means that she will not have the remuneration which a partner
in this firm may expect. Whether the suggested arrangement is illegal
is a hard question, but I believe that it does violate the act. One can
argue that the act only prohibits discrimination in "employment"
and that whether one is eligible to become a partner has nothing to
do with his status as an employee. However, to say that the prospect
of becoming a partner is not one of the attributes or "privileges" of
employment with a law firm is to ignore reality. The difference in
status between the permanent associate and the young man on his
way up illustrates this fact,90 as do the attitudes of the job-seeking
law student and the sales talk of the hiring partner.91 Undoubtedly
the prospect of an early partnership and the added compensation
which it is expected to bring can offset other detriments of a job,
such as comparatively low beginning pay or undesirable working
conditions. Thus I classify the opportunity to compete for a partner-
ship position as one of the "privileges" of employment of which the
act speaks. To deny this opportunity to the woman is to discriminate
against her in a way prohibited by the act.92
89. Of course the employer will still have violated the act if he excludes women
from the regular associate positions on the basis of sex.
90. See SMIrEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 231 (1964):
Associates also divide into strata. . . . []hey can be broken down (though this
is not done formally) into permanent, senior, middle and junior associates. The
permanent associates are divided into two categories-those with relatively high
status in the firm and those who are regarded as failures. The first classification
is composed of men who because of their specialty (labor law), or their origin
are not asked to be partners. These men often are doing important, imaginative
jobs. The recognition of this lies in their secure tenure and in their salaries.
These men earn between $18,000 and $30,000 a year. One reported a much higher
salary. In the second segment of this category, where the majority of this group
are found, are the "failures"; models not to follow. They do the routine work.
Their salaries however are only slightly lower than those of the other permanent
associates. Perhaps what distinguished these subcategories as much as anything
else is that those who are engaged in creative work and are not made partners
are supported by group rationalization. Those who are engaged in routine work
and are considered failures have to depend upon their own rationalizations.
91. When it is to his advantage, the hiring partner emphasizes the probability of
becoming a partner with his firm, for he recognizes that this probability is an impor-
tant consideration in the student's choice among firms.
92. In its recent opinion letter, the EEOC has suggested that in some cases it may
consider persons who are labeled "partners" to be "employees" under the act. See
note 77 supra. If one adopts the position that some partners are employees in sub-
stance, if not in form, then it becomes easier to find that the woman is discriminated
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A logically similar, but more difficult, question would be raised
if our female applicant will remain an associate forever but will be
paid the same amount of money as if she were a partner. She still has
been denied the privilege of competing for a partnership position,
but she has lost only the status and the voice in decisions which
membership in the partnership may carry. In a firm whose de facto
control is in the hands of one man or a small group of men, her
power to control the activities of the firm may be no greater as a
junior partner than as a senior associate and, therefore, in those cases,
she has lost only the status which may attend being a partner. When
I balance the virtue of letting a lawyer freely choose his own partners
against the minimal discrimination which the woman suffers in this
case, I am hard-put to find a violation of the act. Moreover, the em-
ployer could make a plausible argument that it would be a violation
of his constitutional rights to penalize him for failing to take a
woman into his partnership. 3
The previous discussion has focused on some of the interpretive
difficulties posed by the occupational discrimination provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, there are a number of prac-
tical obstacles to effective enforcement of the act. For example, each
of the foregoing hypothetical cases assumed an employer who is
utterly candid and without guile; each also assumed a woman who
against, for she would be receiving unequal compensation as compared with other
"employees."
93. The firm's most forthright argument would be that the due process clause
of the fifth amendment protects the rights of its members to associate in partnership
with whomever they please. A second less forthright but more fashionable argument
would be that the penumbra cast by the first, and perhaps other, amendments protect
this right. However, it is not likely that the present Supreme Court would be per-
suaded by either of these arguments. The first is a revival of the "freedom of con-
tract" doctrine which is exemplified by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). It
is doubtful whether, at least in the business context, any life remains in the Lochner
doctrine after West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1957), and 80 years of
similar cases, although the doctrine may be viable in certain non-business contexts.
See, e.g., the opinions of Mr. Justices Harlan and White in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 499-507 (1965).
In making its "penumbra" argument, the firm would have to depend upon
Griswold and upon the NAACP cases, i.e., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). A most obvious distinction between the role of
the law firm and that of the NAACP is that the former, despite its protestation to the
contrary, will be cast as an opponent to individual civil rights whereas the latter will
be cast as the proponent of those rights. More important, the Court has said that
the first amendment penumbra extends to the NAACP case because membership in
it is "a form of expression" of particular ideas, attitudes, and ideology. With rare
exceptions, membership in a law firm is not the same kind of "expression." There
are similar obvious difficulties in arguing the applicability of the Griswold case here.
Because the Court in the past 30 years has allowed the state and federal govern-
ment wide latitude in restricting the business activities and because a law firm is
essentially a business activity, albeit one with strong personal, social, and perhaps
even political overtones, it is unlikely that a law firm would be successful in arguing
that it has a constitutionally protected right to deny a partnership to a female.
April 1967] 1107
HeinOnline  -- 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1107 1966-1967
Michigan Law Review
would be hired but for the single fact of her sex. Yet one seldom
meets such a guileless and candid lawyer, and he does not often see
such clear-cut cases. Nearly every employer may weigh intangibles
such as grades, background, experience, and personality in selecting
a lawyer-employee. Consequently, the first problem is proving that
any specific refusal to hire a woman was caused by sex discrimination.
For every female an employer has rejected, he may be able to show
ten rejected males of apparently equal credentials. Thus even if one
hypothesizes a situation in which one hundred employers were uni-
formly discriminating on the basis of sex, one would be fortunate if
he were able to prove discrimination on the part of even a few of
them unless his case were aided by powerful presumptions of dis-
crimination. 4 However, no such presumptions exist in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95
A second limitation on the effectiveness of such legislation is that,
in practice, a complaint will probably be required to set the act's
enforcement machinery in motion 8 Where does one find a female
lawyer complainant? Since no female employee of a law firm who
wishes to remain with that firm will enter a complaint against her
employer, 7 the only possible sources of complaints are disappointed
job applicants and those who complain about their former em-
ployers. 8 Yet one can seriously question how many female lawyers
94. The admissions of employers may be one possible source of proof: nearly 2,000
cases of explicit admissions of sex discrimination were reported in the survey. One
would guess that the threat of the act would at least cause employers to stop making
such statements, but it is possible that lying is so odious to some employers that they
would admit their sex discrimination. Such an admission against interest would be
good evidence of violation of the act.
95. Some of these difficulties inherent in proving discrimination have been solved
in the housing cases by having a white attempt to rent or buy a dwelling from which
a Negro has been turned away. Iglauer, A Nice Place to Live, The New Yorker,
Sept. 24, 1966, p. 188. For a variety of reasons this technique would not work well
in the lawyer's case. Unlike the landlord, the lawyer may turn away many applicants
before he hires one and for that reason, one cannot infer from his refusal to hire a
female and his hiring of a male that he discriminated on the basis of sex. Second,
there is no assurance that the male "plant" would be hired even if the employer
discriminated against the female.
96. The act permits the Commission to bring court action without a complainant
in certain cases, see 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a), -6(a) (1964), but unless
the Commission gets only a few complaints or acquires a large investigatory staff,
most of its action is likely to be in response to complaints.
97. Because he may be effectively insulated from management by his union, a shop
employee may be able to complain without rendering his working conditions intoler-
able. But the lawyer-employee is not so protected.
98. The thought of "Maud Jones' case" appeals to my sense of whimsy. Assume
that Maud has been a faithful lawyer employee at a large Wall Street law firm for
the 20 years from 1965 to 1985. Finally, in 1985, she quits work in anger. Ultimately
she goes to the EEOC and commences suit against the law firm alleging a violation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She seeks $100,000 back pay on the theory that she has
been underpaid by an average of $5,000 per year by comparison with male employees
of the firm of similar experience and ability. One can picture the pandemonium which
Maud's subpoena for the last 20 years of payroll records might set loose in her old
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are anxious for the notoriety such a conflict might bring or are
willing to risk the kind of stigmatization which such a complaint
about former or prospective employers might cause.
Because proof of sex discrimination will be difficult at best and
because no more than a small fraction of those in a position to com-
plain can be expected to do so, I hold little hope for change through
direct application of anti-discrimination legislation. It is possible,
of course, that the mere existence of the 1964 act may affect the
behavior of lawyer-employers who are included within its coverage;
surely lawyers and judges have often counseled others about the
virtues of obeying the law. Perhaps some will now feel compelled to
comply with the law despite the fact that its sanctions inspire no real
fear.
D. Other Governmental Activities
Any government as sophisticated as our own controls its citizens'
behavior by a variety of means besides the prohibiting of undesirable
conduct. Persuasion, and particularly persuasion reinforced by the
potential use of power, is one common method of controlling be-
havior. Establishing an example for others to follow is a second.99
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 charges the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission with the "persuasion" function which is
now carried out, with varying degrees of success, by a number of
other governmental agencies. 100 Although the commission has ruled
that law firms are subject to the act's coverage, 0 1 it remains to be
seen how effective it will be. Racial discrimination will surely receive
firm. Of course, the problems of proof, the statute of limitations, and other legal
hurdles might stand in the way of Maud's recovery, but she will have a strong
bargaining lever if she can find a judge willing to order the production of such
sacrosanct records.
99. A third method is to give some kind of subsidy in order to encourage desired
behavior. The subsidy is both the most direct and the least likely solution to female
lawyer discrimination. In his flights of fancy one can imagine what would happen to
the market for female lawyers if Congress enacted a female equivalent of a depletion
allowance which authorized an employer to deduct 200% of any female lawyer's
salary from his gross income or allowed her partners to deduct twice her share of the
partnership profits. The government could give other less imaginative and direct
subsidies in the form of stipends for continued education and specialized training
either in school or with another specialist. Our data suggest that such specialization
often substantially improves the income of female lawyers. See Exhibit 13 supra. The
likelihood of a subsidy's enactment probably varies directly with the proposed bene-
ficiaries' political power. Unless the country's 7,000 female lawyers ride a wave generated
by the demands of a large segment of the women in our society, it is most unlikely
that they will be subsidized.
100. The Securities and Exchange Commission's bargaining with corporation at-
torneys over the content of prospectuses is a good example of this function at work.
The process is fully described in Jennings, Self-regulation in the Securities Industry:
The Role of the SEC, 29 LAw & Co ' mrp. PRoa. 663 (1964).
101. See note 73 supra.
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the bulk of the commission's attention, and the resources which it
can devote to sex discrimination must cover a field in which the
female lawyer is a nearly inconspicuous part. When one also con-
siders the difficulty of proving discrimination against a lawyer, the
probability of large-scale commission action on behalf of the woman
lawyer becomes remote.
On the other hand, if the federal government itself faithfully
carries out its stated policies on employment of women, it will offer
a useful example for others' emulation and study. For example, the
federal civil service hiring rules provide that a woman may not be
considered unfit for a job just because she must travel with males,
do outdoor work, or work in teams "or units with males.102 The data
collected from the federal government's experience with women in
many of these jobs-particularly in supervisory capacities-will
greatly increase the available knowledge about women's perfor-
mance. If the data are favorable, they will form a basis for attacking
some of the common arguments against the employment of women.
E. Collective Action
The power exerted in Congress, in the courts, and in disputes
with public officials by the NAACP, CORE, and other Negro orga-
nizations is a striking aspect of the current Negro revolution. Surely
the fact that the Negro has been able to form these large and com-
paratively cohesive groups has lent great weight to his threats and
demands and has made his boycotts, sit-ins, and lie-ins much more ef-
fective than they otherwise would have been.10 3 However, an attempt
to apply the learning of the Negro's case to the female lawyer reveals
102. The Federal Personnel Manual lists the following conditions which may not
be used as bases for sex discrimination:
(1) Travel including extensive travel, travel in remote areas, or travel with a
person or persons of the opposite sex.
(2) Rotating assignments or other shift work.
(3) Geographical location, neighborhood environment, or outdoor work.
(4) Contact with public or a particular group or groups.
(5) Exposure to weather.
(6) Living or working facilities, except where the sharing of common living
quarters with members of the opposite sex would be required.
(7) Working with teams or units of opposite sex.
(8) Monotonous, detailed, or repetitious duties.
(9) Limited advancement opportunities.
UNITED STATES CIVIL SERv. COMM'N, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL ch. 713-7 & -8 (1963).
For a general discussion of the application of these provisions to the entire field of sex
discrimination, see Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow & the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 282 (1965).
103. The collective action of the Jewish community has blunted the effect of dis-
crimination in a different way. By patronizing the "Jewish" law firms, Jewish business-
men have probably rendered the discrimination which existed against Jewish lawyers
less damaging to those lawyers than it might otherwise have been. SMIGEL, op. cit. supra
note 90, at 173-75, discusses the "Jewish" law firm and suggests that this combination
of Jewish businessmen with Jewish firms is not universal and may be waning.
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the uniqueness of her status. The woman, unlike many Negroes, lives
in intimate daily contact with members of the discriminating group.
Indeed, some of the most important relationships in her personal
life-those with her husband, son, father, and brothers-are with
members of the discriminating group. Moreover, a substantial body
of American women may regard the goals of the working woman as
improper. For these reasons, few women, even few women lawyers,
can be expected to attack the discriminating male with the vigor with
which the Negro attacks discriminating whites. 04
Of course, the thought of a group of women lawyers sitting-in is
outrageous. Even if one could find women lawyers who were willing
to take such action, such gross force might not be able to accomplish
the female lawyer's selective goals. Such action has succeeded in
opening segregated restaurants to Negroes, but one can doubt its
ability to produce the kind of acceptance and treatment which a
woman seeks from a law firm.
Nevertheless, collective action in a different dimension offers
some possibilities. There are many women-lawyer groups in the
country: some independent, others associated with state bar associa-
tions.10 5 The literature of one of these groups gives the impression
that they have been more interested in denying the existence of
discrimination and in playing the males' Uncle Tom than in seeking
to overcome discrimination.' 0s Yet it is these associations of women
lawyers that offer the greatest hope for collective action. Such orga-
104. Our female lawyer also differs from the Jew in that she cannot look to other
members of her group to form a desirable clientele. Through their shareholdings,
women may own a large part of American industry, but they do not manage it. They
can bring probate and domestic relations matters to their female cohorts, but they
cannot offer the lawyer's staple-business practice. Moreover, many women may prefer
male lawyers because they disapprove of working women. Thus women lawyers cannot
expect the kind of collective support from other women which Jewish lawyers have
apparently been able to count on from other Jews.
105. The largest single group is the National Association of Women Lawyers
(N.A.W.L.), which publishes the Women Lawyers' Journal. In addition to the national
groups, there are many state and local organizations such as the Women's Bar Associa-
tion of Illinois and the Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia.
106. See, e.g., Talley, Women Lawyers of Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 46
WOMEN LAw. J. 21 (Summer 1960). Her opening statement is indicative of the tone of
the article.
There might have been a time when a women lawyer could have been referred
to as an oddity because the general public was unaccustomed to the idea of
women entering this career; but in today's enlightened world it is indeed an
"odd" community which does not accept upon full and equal status, the woman
and the man lawyer of equal training, ability, and experience.
Ibid. Even a report made by Esther Peterson, a member of the President's Commission
on the Status of Women, discloses the belief that women lawyers have already con-
quered discrimination. She points out the inspiring qualities of women lawyers
"because the career of each of you exemplifies the conquest of circumstances which the
Report finds tend to handicap women." Peterson, Report of the Commission on the
Status of Women, 50 WOMEN LAw. J. 47 (1964).
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nizations might at least prick the male conscience by advocating the
female lawyer's just due, and they could encourage or extend studies
such as this one.
F. Law Schools
There are no women on the teaching faculty of which I am a
member, and everyone who is familiar with the law school world
knows that this situation is the rule, not the exception.10 7 Whether
or not this absence of female teachers is due to discrimination in the
hiring practices of law schools (and it is possible that it is), it may
reinforce the propriety of discrimination in student and alumni
minds. Surely the law schools could do more than they have done to
erase this impression by finding and hiring able women lawyers as
teachers. Moreover, exposing male law students to a hard-minded
and able female law teacher might overcome some of their Victorian
ideas about the intellectual and emotional abilities of women. 0 8
Those law schools which maintain active placement offices have
at their disposal a second and more powerful lever by which to effect
change. Law firms often depend upon good relations with the place-
ment director, the faculty, or both, to attract desirable graduates,
and many firms acquire new associates principally by interviewing
at law school placement offices. If any such firm were barred from
contact with the placement offices of a number of the largest law
schools, the minimum result would be a large increase in their cost
of recruiting. Although the survey response from placement directors
and deans revealed little to support such a suggestion, placement
officers and faculties at some schools may have contributed to the
apparent reduction of discrimination against Jews over the past
quarter of a century. Help with respect to discrimination against
women could conceivably come from an association of law schools
which is currently attempting to exert some control over the hiring
practices of employers who interview at their schools.10 9 Because of
107. The 1966 Directory of Law Teachers published by West Publishing Co. lists
92 persons with common female names on the faculties of the 134 accredited law
schools in the country (The name of a male faculty-member at the University of
Michigan Law School, Beverley Pooley, discloses the fallibility of this method of
determining sex). From the biographical listings in the same book, it appears that
51 of these are full-time teaching members on the faculties of 38 schools. Each of
the other persons appears to hold a librarian's position or holds that position and
teaches only a legal bibliography course. Our best estimate from the same source
of the total number of teaching faculty members at these schools is 2,335. The female
teaching members make up slightly more than 2% of this group, a figure not greatly
different from female representation in the bar generally.
108. It is possible that a law student's propensity to discriminate would be increased
by his suffering under the lash of a tough female teacher.
109. A group of law schools have already established some rules which are embodied
in a statement entitled "Interviewing Procedures for Law Students and Prospective
1112 [Vol. 65:1051
HeinOnline  -- 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1112 1966-1967
Women in the Law
the power which the law school has through its placement office and
because of the respect which many alumni have for the faculties of
their law schools, it is possible that those employers who presently
discriminate against women would give serious consideration to
changing their policies if the faculties of the various law schools,
by deed and word, expressed their belief that such discrimination
was not justified and should not be continued.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
The rapid change in the American Negro's status during the
middle of the twentieth century after nearly a century of apparent
stagnation will provide fodder for more than one generation of
sociologists. At present we are still arguing about what has happened
to the Negro; we have barely given serious consideration to why it is
happening. This difficulty in understanding and explaining a phe-
nomenon which is clearly in full swing illustrates the problem (and
folly) of one who would suggest the means of accomplishing a similar
change in outlook with respect to women.
The prospects for reducing discrimination against female lawyers
by applying the forces presently at hand, at least when exercised at
their present strength, are not bright. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
is hardly the weapon with which the female lawyer can slay her oppo-
nents. Despite the commission's recent ruling that law firms are
subject to the act, surely lawyers will not freely acknowledge that
they are covered by the act until the courts have passed on the
question. Even then, the difficulty of proving a violation and of find-
ing a willing complainant will restrict the Civil Rights Act's effect
upon the legal profession. The probability of a collective female up-
rising on the scale of the current Negro activity also is remote-the
current female lawyer organizations show little inclination to tackle
the male bar.
Thus if substantial change is to come about in the reasonably
early future, other more effective weapons must be brought into
play. The first and perhaps most important effort, one which should
be undertaken immediately, is a more thorough and sophisticated
study of the woman's effectiveness as a lawyer. Such a study might
prove that the woman is a somewhat less effective lawyer than is the
male, yet it is difficult to believe that she could be found sufficiently
inferior to her male counterpart in lawyer skill to justify more than
a part of the income differential described above. In this mysterious
process by which society's collective conscience is pricked, the pro-
Employers." There is no reason why these rules could not be expanded to provide
some sanctions against persons who discriminate unjustly against women.
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posed study may be a more effective stimulus for change than any of
the other tools available.
The second most likely source of aid to the woman lawyer is the
law schools. The faculties of American law schools have been the
proponents of change in many other ways and there is no reason why
they cannot at least display their willingness to hire female lawyers;
in addition, they can impress upon their alumni and others using
their placement facilities that they doubt the propriety of much of
the present discrimination against women lawyers.
Finally, women lawyers themselves should undertake increased
collective action. Although the responses to our questionnaire
showed that many women lawyers deny the existence of discrimina-
tion and could not be counted upon for help,110 many others re-
sponded with a feeling and intensity which suggests a willingness to
support collective action by a female bar group.": This action could
take the form of research and writing to stimulate the consciences of
male lawyers, or it might press the new Civil Rights Section of the
American Bar Association to undertake an early consideration of the
problem of lawyer sex discrimination.
No one can predict with certainty whether it will take five years,
five decades, or longer for the cumulative impact of the various forces
at hand to produce a substantial change in the status of women
lawyers. We can only hope the time is closer to five than to fifty years.
110. The following are excerpts from letters which we received from some such
female respondents:
My personal feeling is that discrimination against women in the law has
largely been caused by the women themselves. A woman must earn her place
in the profession the same as a man. She cannot sit on her femininity and expect
success to come to her merely because she is a fragile flower who has become
accustomed to having things done for her. She must learn to compete, and if
she is not successful in the competition she should search for reasons within
herself and not simply declare, "I lost, because I am a woman lawyer, and women
are discriminated against."
I have found little or no prejudice, discrimination or whatever, where I have
been co-operative, courteous and informed as to the "law." I believe this to be
the case with most "female" attorneys. If it is not, then perhaps they should
re-examine their position.
The only "citadel of discrimination against women lawyers" is the one they
have created themselves and then have not been able to cope with. . . .The
more these men are harrassed by the fight for women's rights, the more they
are going to be against them.
111. The following show the converse:
Congratulations. It is good to see that you are taking an interest in this
matter of discrimination against women lawyers-a most deplorable state of
affairs.
I am gratified to learn that someone outside our group recognizes that there
is a problem.
God bless you for taking on "our" cause, and forgive me for being so late in
lending my support .... [S]uch an "assault upon the citadel," is long overdue.
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APPENDIX A
1. INIAL LETTER TO FE ALE LAWYERS
This is a form letter; however we beseech you not to throw it into
the wastebasket. You and a number of other female lawyers have a vital
part in a study we are conducting at the University of Michigan Law
School. We are attempting to examine the discrimination which we fear
exists against women lawyers. In order to gather data about that dis-
crimination we are writing to you, to a number of other women lawyers,
and to a number of male lawyers whom we will use as a control group.
It is fully as important that those of you who are out of practice, either
temporarily or permanently, answer our questionnaire as it is that those
of you who are in practice answer it. It is only through a uniform re-
sponse that we will be able to gather statistics which may form a basis
for an assault upon the citadel of discrimination against women lawyers.
We ask, therefore, that you fill out the enclosed questionnaire care-
fully and fully and that you return it to us. If there are questions which
appear presumptuous to you, I hope you will not be offended by them.
We ask them only in an attempt to get all the information which will be
relevant to the determination of the nature and effect of discrimination
against women lawyers.
Be assured that our findings will not reveal the names or identities of
any of our respondents. We ask that you put your name on the portion
of the last page below the dotted line only because we wish to know who
has not responded so that we can resolicit their answers. As soon as your
questionnaire is received and before it is examined, a secretary will tear
off the portion with your name on it and the questionnaire will be anony-
mous thereafter.
We enlist your support in a common cause. We look forward to, and
thank you for, your cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
James J. White
Assistant Professor of Law
2. SECOND LETTER TO FEmALE LAWYERS
Some months ago we sent you a questionnaire in the hope that you
could aid our investigation of the question of discrimination against
women lawyers. Since we have received no response from you and
because the information which you can provide is important to us, we
are enclosing another copy of the questionnaire. Whether or not you
are now practicing law, we hope that you can take a few minutes out of
what is probably a busy day to fill out our questionnaire and furnish us
with the information we need. Thank you for your help.
Sincerely yours,
James J. White
Assistant Professor of Law
3. INITIAL LETTER TO MALE LAWYERS
I'm certain that you have better things to do than to fill out question-
naires for crackpot professors. Nevertheless I ask you to take fifteen
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minutes to fill out this one crackpot questionnaire. I must acknowledge
that this act will produce absolutely no reward for you, no money, no
favor in return, probably not even a good feeling in the bottom of your
heart, yet your individual cooperation is important to us.
We are conducting a nationwide study of the opportunities, difficul-
ties, and successes of women lawyers. Your law school has given us your
name to use as part of our control group. Needless to say, your response
as a member of that small group is more important than the response
of any individual among the female group.
Be assured that no respondent will be named or otherwise identified
in our study and that we will keep your response in confidence. We ask
that you put your name on the portion of the last page below the per-
foration only because we wish to know who has not responded so that
we can re-solicit their answers. As soon as your questionnaire is received
and before it is examined, a secretary will tear off the portion with your
name on it and the questionnaire will be anonymous thereafter.
We ask, then, that you indulge this one crackpot scheme by giving
us some time, some thought, and by returning a completed questionnaire
to us. Thank you.
Sincerely yours,
James J. White
Assistant Professor of Law
4. SECOND LETTER TO MALE LAWYERS
Some months ago we sent you a questionnaire in the hope that you
could aid our investigation of the question of discrimination against
women lawyers. Since we have received no response from you and
because the information which you can provide is important to us, we are
enclosing another copy of the questionnaire. Whether or not you are
now practicing law, we hope that you can take a few minutes out of what
is probably a busy day to fill out our questionnaire and furnish us with
the information we need. Thank you for your help.
Sincerely yours,
James J. White
Assistant Professor of Law
P.S. You are part of a male control group. Because we are attempting
to elicit the same data from our male control group as we get from the
females, the questionnaire will seem more appropriate for a female.
5. QUESTIONNAIRE
[The questionnaires sent male and female respondents were exactly
the same except that the italicized material was included only on the
female questionnaire.]
1. Law school from which graduated
2. Year of graduation from law school
3. What was your approximate class rank in your law school graduat-
ing class? (Circle one)
upper 10%; upper quarter but below upper 10%; second
quarter; third quarter; fourth quarter
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4. Were you on the law review? Yes No
5. Are you married? Yes No If yes, what was the date of your
marriage?
6. If you have any children please state the ages of each of them.
7. Name each of the states (including D. C.) in which you are author-
ized to practice law.
8. Approximately how many of each of the following types of prospec-
tive employers did you interview or write to when you were seeking
your first permanent job after law school? (Include all those you con-
tacted while still in school. Place number contacted next to the
type of employer.)
law firms-of 30 or more lawyers ....... 15 to 30 ....... 5 to
15 ....... 4 or under ...... ; federal governmental agencies
...... ; state or local governmental agencies ...... ; judges ...... ;
corporations ...... ; banks and trust companies ...... ; unions
...... ; non-law jobs (describe type) ........
9. Identify below the sources of all offers of employment which you
received when you were seeking your first permanent job after law
school. (Include all offers you received while you were in law school.
Place number of offers next to employer making offer.)
law firm-of 30 or more lawyers ....... 15 to 30 ....... 5 to
15 ....... 4 or under ...... ; federal governmental agencies
...... ; state or local governmental agencies ...... ; judges ...... ;
corporations ...... ; banks and trust companies ...... ; unions
...... ; non-law jobs (describe type) ........
10. How many of each of the following types of employers stated a
policy to you against the hiring of women as lawyers?
law firm-of 30 or more lawyers ....... 15 to 30 ....... 5 to
15 ....... 4 or under ...... ; federal governmental agencies
...... ; state or local governmental agencies ...... ; judges ...... ;
corporations ...... ; banks and trust companies ...... ; unions
...... ; non-law jobs (describe type) ........
11. In the order in which you held them, please list each of the non-
temporary jobs and activities which you have held since graduation
from law school.
SAMPLE
Type From- Full- Reason
Type job employer Type work To Part time for Leaving
Assoc. in Private General 9/60- Full Slow
law firm firm-21 practice 10/62 - advancement
Sample
Housewife
10/62
- present
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12. If you are not presently practicing, do you plan to practice again
sometime in the future?
13. If you are not presently practicing, why not? (Circle one or more)
I found other work more interesting
I found other work more remunerative
I lost interest in law practice
I ceased practice to get married
I ceased practice to have a baby
I ceased practice to devote time to my family
14. Which, if any, of your relatives were lawyers?
father; mother; uncle; aunt; grandfather; grandmother
15. How would you describe your motivation to attend law school on
the following scale: (List your motivation with respect to each motive)
Very
important Imp. So-so Not imp.
Desire to help society
Desire for prestigious
position
Continuing intellectual
stimulation
Good way to make an
honorable living
Interesting field to know
Good remuneration
16. What was or will be your approximate adjusted gross income (gross
income less business expenses) in your first non-temporary job after
law school? (Do not include income earned by your spouse.)
less than $1,000; $1,001-$5,000; $5,001-$8,000; $8,001-$10,000;
over $10,000
17. What was your approximate adjusted gross income in the calendar
year 1964? (Do not include income earned by your spouse. If you
graduated from law school in 1964 or 1965, report your estimate of
your adjusted gross income in your first full calendar year after
law school.)
less than $1,000; $1,001-$5,000; $5,001-$8,000; $8,001-
$10,000; $10,001-$14,000; $14,001-$17,000; $17,001-$20,000;
*20,001-$25,000; $25,001-$30,000; over $30,000
18. If you work for a federal governmental agency please answer the
following:
By which agency are you employed?
What is your G.S. level?
When were you raised to your present G.S. level?
How long ago did you receive your last raise within your present
G.S. level?
What type of work do you perform? (Circle one or more)
litigation; labor; tax; corporate; real property; crim-
inal; other (specify)
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Have you had offers of employment from lawyers in private prac-
tice with whom you have had professional contact?
never; a few; frequently
If you are able to identify a person who preceded you in your
present job, what was the sex of that person?
male; female
19. If you are presently in practice with a private firm or as a counsel
employed by a corporation, association, union, bank or trust com-
pany, please answer the following questions:
How frequently do you meet with and counsel clients?
less than one client a week; 1-5 clients a week; 5-10;
10-15; 15-20; 20-25; more than 25
What percentage of these clients are women?
less than 25%; 25-50%; 50-75%; more than 75%
Do you try cases in court on behalf of your clients?
none last year; 1-5 last year; 5-10 last year; 10-15 last year;
15-20 last year; more than 20
Do you appear before state, local or federal administrative tribu-
nals on behalf of your clients?
none last year; 1-5 times last year; 5-10 last year; 10-15
last year; 15-20 last year; more than 20
What type or types of work do you perform among the following?
litigation; trusts, estates and probate; labor; tax;
corporate; real estate; criminal; domestic relations;
other (specify)
Have you experienced resistance on the part of male clients to
accept your advice and counsel?
never; occasionally; frequently; almost always
Have you experienced resistance on the part of female clients to
accept your advice and counsel?
never; occasionally; frequently; almost always
20. If you have experienced such resistance on the part of male clients,
have you found that you were able to overcome it after a period of
association with a client?
always; usually; seldom; hardly ever
21. If you have experienced such resistance on the part of female clients,
have you found that you were able to overcome it after a period of
association with a client?
always; usually; seldom; hardly ever
22. What techniques have you used and would you suggest in over-
coming such resistance? (You may use additional pages if necessary.)
23. Do you believe that you have been the object of discrimination be-
cause of your sex by your present employer, by your former em-
ployer, or by any potential employer from whom you sought a job?
certainly; almost certainly; probably; probably not;
certainly not
24. What advice about seeking employment as a lawyer would you give
a present-day female law graduate?
25. If you "had it to do over" would you again become a lawyer?
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6. LETTER To PLACEMENT DIREaroRs AND DEANS
I am writing to make a burdensome-perhaps unreasonable-request
of you. We are preparing to do a study of discrimination against women
lawyers. We believe that this problem is deserving of attention and con-
cern by every placement office and faculty member in our schools; there-
fore our request is in the name of a serious and important cause.
Without the assistance of yourself and others like you, we will not
be able to accomplish our study, for it is only through you that we will
be able to contact any substantial number of male and female lawyers
from which we hope to get most of our data. Our principal request, and
the one which I fear is quite burdensome, is that you send us the names
and last known addresses of each of your women graduates in the classes
of 1956 through 1965. Secondly, we request that you also send us an equal
number of names of male students in the same classes together with their
last known addresses in order that we might use these male students as
a control group. If you have lists or directories from which we would
be able to select names ourselves, that would be perfectly acceptable
to us.
We propose to write to each of the male and female graduates whose
names you give us and ask them questions about their present employ-
ment and about what jobs they have had and about job changes. It is
our hope to determine whether or not there is discrimination against
female lawyers, and secondly to determine whether or not the discrimina-
tion, if any, is based upon sound reasons. For instance, we hope to
determine whether it is true that many women lawyers do get married
and quit practicing and are therefore poorer employment risks than
male students. Doubtless you are aware that this is a reason frequently
given for the refusal to hire a woman. In short we wish to compare the
actual performance of women with that of their male counterparts to
see if this reason and others often given stand up in practice.
Be assured that all material in our study will be presented anony-
mously and that no individual or school will be identified unless we first
receive permission to identify such person or school.
I am sure this brief explanation reveals that our study will be only
as good as the data we can collect. I am sure, too, that you can see that
you are a most important link in the chain through which we hope to
procure the data. I hope that you will do us the very great favor of
sending us the list of names which we have requested and of filling out
the enclosed questionnaire. When we conclude our study we will be
happy to share it with you.
Thank you.
Sincerely yours,
James J. White
Assistant Professor of Law
7. QUESTIONNAIRE TO PLACEMENT DiREcroRs AND DEANS
Name
Address
1. How many prospective employers (firms, companies, and agencies)
interviewed students at your school in the 1964-65 school year?
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2. How many of these actually interviewed women students?
3. How many, if any, refused to interview women students?
4. How many, if any, refused to interview women students unless the
women met a higher or different standard than the male students
whom they were interviewing?
5. In the last three years how many specific requests for female law
students, if any, have you had?
6. If you have had some such requests, from what kind of employers
(e.g., private firms, corporations, government) did you receive them?
7. Of the women graduates in the classes of 1965, '64, and '63, how
many acquired jobs upon graduation in the following situations:
a. law firm of 30 or more lawyers
b. law firm of 15 to 30
c. law firm of 5 to 15
d. law firm of 4 and under
e. house counsel of a corporation
f. clerkship with a federal or state judge
g. federal governmental agency
h. state or local governmental agency
i. job if any unknown
j. non-legal work
8. In your opinion is the percentage of women graduates from your
school who accept non-legal jobs greater than the percentage of
male students who accept such jobs?
9. If during your tenure in office you have observed discrimination in
hiring against Negroes or other minority groups, have the amount
and type of that discrimination changed during your tenure?
10. If you have found that there has been discrimination against
Negroes or other minority groups and if you have found that the
pattern of discrimination has changed or has disappeared, what in
your opinion were the causes for such change or disappearance?
11. Did any activity on the part of the law school itself or the law faculty
have anything to do with promoting such change? If so, please
describe that activity.
12. If two law students, one a male and one a female, with equal records
are competing for a job, is the female student (as likely) (more likely)
(less likely) to get the job (as) (than) the male student?
13. In your opinion is there discrimination against women in hiring?
14. If you believe there is discrimination, would you describe it as
(insignificant) (significant) (extensive)?
Please feel free to include an additional page or pages if you have
additional information which might be helpful to us.
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APPENDIX B
RESPONSE RATES
First Mailing Second Mailing
Questionnaires Sent Out 4326 2036
Returned Unclaimed 803
Refused to Participate 26
Actual Mailing Sample 3997 2036
COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES RETURNED
PerCent
Per Cent Per Cent of Actual
of First of Second Mailing
First Mailing Second Mailing Sample
Mailing Returned Mailing Returned Total Returned
Male 988 49.4% 341 33.5% 1329 66.4%
Female 975 48.7% 323 31.7% 1298 64.8%
1963 49.1% 664 32.6% 2627 65.7%
APPENDIX C
STARTING INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Range Females Males
less than $1,000 72 9
$1,001-$5,000 417 314
$5,001-$8,000 561 699
$8,001-$10,000 81 139
over $10,000 43 116
1,174 1,277
PRESENT INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Range Females Males
less than $1,000 45 18
$1,001-$5,000 155 83
$5,001-$8,000 270 337
$8,001-$10,000 194 256
$10,001-S14,000 136 312
$14,001-$17,000 17 113
$17,001-$20,000 8 41
$20,001-$25,000 6 63
$25,001-$30,000 1 25
over $30,000 2 29
834 1,277
PRESENT AVERAGE INCOME BY YEARS SINCE GRADUATION
Years Since Graduation
0-1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Males $8,000 $8,500 $9,900 $11,300 $12,600 $14,100 $15,700 $16,800 $17,300
Females $6,500 $6,600 $6,700 $ 7,400 $ 8,000 $ 7,500 $ 8,100 $ 9,500 $ 9,000
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